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LIMITING THE CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER:
NEW ROLES FOR THE PROSECUTOR
AND THE GRAND JURY
Richard B. Kuhns'»
wo factors distinguish the courts' criminal contempt power1
from the power to prosecute individuals for ordinary criminal
violations. The first and most important distinction is that the
contempt power, in theory, is inherent in the courts and therefore
not dependent upon legislative authorization.2 The rationale for
an inherent judicial contempt power is necessity: A court must
have the power, as an incident of its existence, to protect itself
against abuses and to vindicate its authority. 3 The second distinction, a corollary of the inherent power doctrine, is that courts may
exercise the contempt power in a relatively summary manner. Some
contempts are summary in the sense that the court may charge and
convict the contemnor without any prior notice or hearing.4 This
departure from traditional notions of due process is justified on the
ground that the court must act immediately in order to vindicate
its authority. 5 Other contempts are summary only in the sense that
the contemnor, while entitled to prior notice and hearing, is. not
entitled to all of the procedural protections available in ordinary
criminal prosecutions. 6 In these cases the asserted justification for

T
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1. For the distinctions between criminal and civil contempt, see text at notes 149-73
infra.
2, Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &: Omaha Ry.,
266 U.S. 42 (1924); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1837), See generally
J. Fox, THE HlsTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927); R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER (1963); 1 NATIONAL COMMN. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAws, 'WORKING
PAPERS 601-03, 643 (1970) [hereinafter WoRIUNG PAPERS].
3. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
4. See, e.g., Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949).
5. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1965).
6. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 184-87 (1958). But cf, Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 201-08 (1968).
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treating criminal contempts differently from ordinary criminal
prosecutions is that the inherent nature of the contempt power gives
the contempt offense a sui generis character.7
This article will briefly describe the development and scope of
the law of criminal contempt,8 and then tum to the question of
whether the current exercise of the power is consistent with the
rationale for its existence. The analysis will suggest not only that the
answer to this question in many instances is negative, but also that
substantial benefits would result from requiring that criminal contempts be treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions.
At the outset, it is important to note three limitations on the
scope of this article. First, analysis is limited primarily to situations
in which some form of prior notice and hearing is required before
applying a criminal contempt sanction. Second, although the criminal contempt sanction may be invoked to deal with such diverse
conduct as disruption of judicial proceedings,9 violations of orders
prohibiting dissemination of pre-trial information,10 violations of
7. See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924); United States v. Barnett, 346
F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).
8. Several Supreme Court opinions deal at length with the nature and scope of
the contempt power. E.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-219 (1958) (Black,
J., dissenting); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 23-42 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cases cited note 150 infra.
·
Although slightly dated in parts, the best contemporary work on the law of contempt is R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2. See also J. Fox, supra note 2; Dobbs, Contempt
of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 183 (1971); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of
Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1010 (1924); Note, Procedures for
Trying Contempts in the Federal Courts, 73 HARv, L. R.Ev. 353 (1959).
The contempt power includes the power to impose both criminal and civil contempt sanctions. However, except for pointing out that adoption of the recommendations made here will have the benefit of eliminating confusion that sometimes
exists over whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal, see text at notes 149-75
infra, this article deals solely with the criminal contempt power.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
851 (1949). See generally N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER rn THE COURT (1973).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), on remand,.349
F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), afjd., 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979
(1973).
In England, the contempt power is commonly used to deal with prejudiciai or
unflattering publications about judicial proceedings. See generally G. BoRRIE & N.
LOWE, THE LAW OF CONTEMPT (1973). However, in the United States the availability
of the contempt sanction for this purpose is limited by the first amendment. See
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). On
the problem of balancing the rights of fair trial and free press, see A. FRIENDLY &
R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBUCITY (1967); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication
in the United States, 28 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 401 (1928); Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Operation of the Jury System, Recommendations
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969).
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labor injunctions,11 and failure to pay alimony or support,12 the
analysis and recommendations made here rest in part on practical
considerations that are explored in only one setting: the refusal of a
witness to testify.13 The article suggests that these practical considerations are probably the same in nonwitness cases, but no
attempt is made to verify this hypothesis. Instead, the article sets
forth alternative methods for implementing its proposals that take
into account the possible inapplicability of these practical considerations to some types of contumacious conduct. Finally, because
both the substantive and procedural aspects of contempt vary somewhat among jurisdictions,14 the discussion is limited to federal
practice. Nonetheless, the principles and recommendations set forth
here should be generally applicable to both state and federal jurisdictions.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER

A.

The· Substaritive Scope of the Power

The first significant challenge in this country to the exercise of
criminal contempt power grew out of a federal judge's decision in
1826 to punish without prior notice or hearing an individual who
had published an article critical of pending judicial proceedings.
The public furor over this perceived abuse of power led to the
impeachment of the judge, James Peck.1 ti Although Peck was ultimately acquitted, the incident moved Congress in 1831 to limit the
categories of conduct subject to the courts' contempt power.10 Those
. 11. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See Bartosic & Lanoff,
Escalating the Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REV, 255
(1972).
12. See, e.g., Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938 (1961). See H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 465-71 (1968),
13. See, e.g., United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971).
14. Compare D'Auria & Corcoran, Statutes of New York and Some Aspects of Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 6 NEW ENG, L. REv. 163 (1971); Ellis, The Contempt
Powers of Tennessee Courts, 37 TENN. L. REv. 538 (1970); Ricketts, Direct Contempt
in Oklahoma, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 359 (1973); Snepp, The Law of Contempt in North
Carolina, 7 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. I (1970). See also Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 1258 (1963)
(relationship benveen perjury and contempt in various jurisdictions).
15. A full transcript of the impeachment proceedings before the House and the
Senate appears in A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833).
16. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (19'70).
After defining the courts' contempt power, the 1831 act, in section 2, treated other
obstructions of justice as ordinary criminal offenses. Section 2, as amended, is now
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970). See United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969). For
the legislative history of section 401, see 7 CoNG. DEB. 560-61 (1831), quoted in Frank•
furter & Landis, supra note 8, at 1026 n.75. See also Green v. United States, 356

January 19?5]

Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power

487

limitations are now set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 401, which provides that
a federal court may "punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as (1) [m]isbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . . [and] (3) [d]isobedience or
resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."17
The Supreme Court, while continuing to maintain that the
exercise of judicial contempt power is not dependent upon legislative authorization,18 has recognized that to some extent Congress
may regulate the power,19 and section 401 has been viewed as an
appropriate legislative regulation.20 This judicial deference to
section 401 has manifested itself primarily in two contexts. First,
the Supreme Court has held that to fall within section 401(1) the
misbehavior must occur within the geographic proximity of the
court.21 Second, although several reported cases have upheld without discussion the combined sanction of a fine and a prison sentence,22 the Supreme Court23 and most lower courts24 have adhered
to section 4Ol's limitation of the penalty to fine or imprisonment.25
U.S. 165, 168-73 (1958); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45-49 (1941); United States
v. Essex, 40? F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 20-22; Frankfurter
&: Landis, supra, at 1024-38; Nelles &: King, supra note 10, at 525-32.
17. Section 401(2) permits a court to punish "[m]isbehavior of any of its officers
in their official transactions • • • ." Contempt charges are rarely based on section
401(2), which has been narrowly interpreted by the Supreme Court. See Cammer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1~56) (attorney is not an officer of the court).
18. See cases cited note 2 supra.
19. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &: Omaha Ry.,
266 U.S. 42 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
20. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 203-04 (1968); Nye v. United States, 313
U.S. 33, 4?-48 (1941); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
21. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941). The contempt, however, need not
occur in the presence of a judge. For example, the grand jury is considered an arm
of the court, and contumacious conduct before it has been held to satisfy the presence
requirement of section 401(1). See, e.g., Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st
Cir. 1954) (dictum); In re Michael, 146 F.2d 627 (3d Cir.), revd. on other grounds, 326
U.S. 224 (1945); In re Ellison, 133 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943);
Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 651 (1940).
22. E.g., United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
23. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
24. E.g., Philipps v. United States, 45? F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Temple, 872 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 961 (1967); Carter v.
United States, 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943). Cf. MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d
149, 154 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
25. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1970), which provides a statutory right to jury trial and
limits the potential contempt penalty to six months' imprisonment or $1,000, or both,
in cases in which (1) the conduct constitutes a criminal offense under some statute
other than section 401, and (2) the contempt (a) does not occur in the presence of the
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Criminal Contempt Procedures

For contempts falling within section 401, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure retain the prior judicial practice26 of denying
prior notice and hearing only when the contemnor's conduct occurs
in the immediate view of the judge. Rule 42(a) provides that a
criminal contempt "may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it occurred in the actual presence of the court."27 All other
contempts are governed by rule 42(b), which requires prior notice
and hearing.
Occasionally notice is given by the return of a grand jury indictment, and no court has disapproved this practice.28 Rule 42(b),
court or so near thereto as to constitute an obstruction of justice and (b) is not com•
mitted in violation of a lawful order issued in an action brought in behalf of the United
States.
26. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). Cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517 (1925).
27. FED. R. CRIM. P, 42:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of
record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as
provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice
shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the
criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given
orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on appli•
cation of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for
that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant
is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides,
He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified
from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon
a verdict or finding of gnilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment,
It is important to note that rule 42 is solely procedural. Confusion over this point
occasionally arises because much contempt litigation concerns the appropriate scope
of the summary procedures authorized by rule 42(a) rather than the substantive content of the offense. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965),
28. See United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir. 1971) (contention
that use of indictment violates rule 42 without merit); United States v. Stcrnman,
415 F.2d 1165, 1168 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970) (implicit approval
of use of indictment by rejection of contention that notice in indictment was insuf•
ficient). Cf. United States v. Consolidated Productions, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 603 (C.D.
Cal. 1971); United States v. Cantillon, 309 F. Supp. 700 (C.D. Cal, 1970).
There is also limited precedent for utilization of an information to initiate crim•
inal contempt proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg,, 72 F. Supp.
819 (W.D. Mo. 1947). However, the use of an information has not received explicit
judicial approval, and in some instances the information has been treated merely as
the equivalent of an application for an order to show cause rather than as an independent initiating document. Cf., e.g., O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 681
(8th Cir. 1942), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317
U.S. 412 (1943).
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however, makes no reference to this method of initiating criminal
contempt proceedings, and instead provides that notice shall be
given orally by the judge or by a written order of arrest or-as is
usually the case29-by an order to show cause.
Formerly, despite rule 42(b)'s limitations on the power to punish
contempts ·without notice and hearing, grand jury witnesses who
refused to testify were often denied even these minimal rights
through the simple expedient of convening the grand jury in the
judge's presence and having the witness repeat his refusal. The
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned this practice in 1959,30 but
reversed itself six years later in Harris v. United States. 31 In Harris
the Court noted that the summary procedures under rule 42(a)
should be reserved for exceptional cases of misconduct that require
immediate judicial action,82 and most courts have interpreted rule
42(a) narrowly in cases subsequent to Harris. 83 The Court's recent
holding in United States v. Wilson that rule 42(a) can be used to
punish a witness who refuses to testify at trial, although the refusal
is neither disrespectful nor physically disruptive,84 may, however,
signal a reversal of this trend.
29. See, e.g., Chelf v. Schnackenberg, 384: U.S. 373 (1966); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165 (1958). Cf. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925).
30. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
·
31. 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
32. 382 U.S. at 164 (e.g., "acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or
obstructing court proceedings").
33. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Ciraolo v. Madigan, 443 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1971).
34. No. 73-1162 (U.S., May 19, 1975).
Although the First Circuit had reached the same conclusion, Baker v. Eisenstadt,
456 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972), the Second Circuit,
relying on Harris, had held that rule 42(a) could not be used to punish a witness'
orderly refusal to testify during a trial. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.
1973), reud. No. 73-1162 (U.S., May 19, 1975); United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pace, 371 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. Taylor v. Hayes,
418 U.S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
In Wilson, the Court distinguished Harris on the theory that there is a greater need
for immediate action to coerce testimony in a trial setting than in a grand jury setting:
"Harris ••• recognized • • • that summary punishment may be necessary where a
'refusal [is] ••• an open serious threat to orderly procedure.' [H]ere [the refusall
plainly constituted a literal 'breakdown' of the prosecutor's case." No. 73-1162, slip. op.
at 9-10. But, cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (coercive purpose of
contempt action renders it civil rather than criminal). The Court also noted that rule 42
was "a restatement of the law existing when the rule was adopted" and that "the law
at that time allowed summary punishment for refusals to testify.'' No. 73-1162, slip.

•u&

.

For an excellent discussion of pre-Wilson Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope
of rule 42(a), see United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For the view
that the rule 42(a) summary criminal contempt power should be abolished, see N.
DORSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 232-38. For the proposition that due process
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Criminal contempt cases outside the scope of rule 42(a) have
focused on the applicability of specific procedural guarantees available in ordinary criminal prosecutions. As early as 1822 the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that there were substantial similarities
between criminal contempts and other crimes.36 In 1911 the Court
held that an individual charged with criminal contempt is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that he has the right not to be a witness against himself.36 Three
years later, noting that criminal contempt is a crime unless "we are
in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as that
word has been understood in English speech," the Court held that
criminal contempt was an "offense" for the purposes of a three-year
statute of limitations applicable to all "criminal offenses." 37 In 1925
the Court held that, unless the contempt occurs in the immediate
view of the court, the contemnor is entitled to prior notice, a hearing, representation by counsel, and the opportunity to present and
examine witnesses.38 Other cases have held that the rules of evidence
for criminal trials apply to criminal contempts,30 and that the contemnor has the right to a public trial before an impartial judge,40
a bill of particulars,41 and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.42
Nevertheless, the analogy between criminal contempts and crimrequires notice and hearing in all criminal contempt cases, sec Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process Requires Notice and Hearing
Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 5. CAL. L. R.Ev. 463 (1966); Brief for Petitioner at
47-58, Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
35. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 42-43 (1822), Cf. Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968); New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874);
Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743 (8th Cir. 1916).
36. Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). Cf. Nilva v. United
States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); United States v. Jose, 63 F. 951 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1891).
37. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604-, 610 (1914). Cf. Pendergast v. United
States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
The statute of limitations for criminal contempt actions is now five years unlcss
the contempt is instituted pursuant to 18 U.5.C. § 402, see note 25 supra, in wl1ich
case the period is one year. 18 U.5.C. §§ 3282, 3285 (1970).
38. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
39. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Nilva v. United
States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957); United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094-, 1104-0'1 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 ·u.s. 911 (1971).
40. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); In re Oliver, 833 U.S. 257
(1948). But cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960).
41. United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. m. 1939); Conley v.
United States, 59 F -2d 929 (8th Cir. 1932).
42. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d ll45,
372 (7th Cir. 1972).
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inal prosecutions has never been complete. Most of the cases granting rights to criminal contemnors were based either on statutory
construction43 or on notions of due process,44 and not on the theory
that the rights were guaranteed by the provisions in the Bill of
Rights specifically applicable to "crime[s]" or "criminal prosecutions." In fact, as late as 1958 the Supreme Court affirmed that
contempts are not ordinary crimes but are sui generis, and held
that criminal contemnors are not entitled to a grand jury indictment
or trial by jury.45
•
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed itself on the latter
point and held that a criminal contemnor may not be incarcerated
for more than six months without having had or waived a jury
trial.46 The six-month limitation was derived by analogy to the rule
that jury trials are not constitutionally required for petty offenses.47
While unwilling to hold that violations of section 401, which has no
maximum penalty, are inherently nonpetty, the Court took the position that the imposition of more than a six-month penalty demonstrated that the particular contempt was not petty.48 Thus, in crim43. E.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914) (statute of limitations).
44. E.g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (right to counsel).
45. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958).
46. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,
380 (1966) (dictum).
47. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937). See Frankfurter &: Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. R.Ev. 917 (1926).
Congress has defined a petty offense as one for which the maximum statutory
penalty does not exceed six months' imprisonment or a $500 fine, or both, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1(3) (1970), and the Supreme Court, without specifically adopting this definition
as a constitutional test, has repeatedly emphasized the six-month imprisonment factor
in recent cases dealing with the right to jury trial. See Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). But cf.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) ("we need not, however, settle in this
case the exact location of the line between petty offenses and serious crimes"). For
the proposition that other definitions of petty offenses would be more appropriate
for constitutional purposes, see Kamisar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. I, 68-78
(1963); Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U. L. R.Ev. 445, 453-56 (1965).
48. Regardless of whether one is dealing with ordinary criminal statutes that limit
potential imprisonment to six months or with section 401 contempts, there are two
problems created by the Supreme Court's focus on potential or actual prison sentences to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial. First, if a
defendant is convicted of several offenses, none of which alone would require trial
by jury, is it appropriate to deny a jury trial and, at the same time, impose an
aggregate sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment? Second, even if there is a
statutory limit of six months' imprisonment, or if in a section 401 contempt proceeding no jail sentence is imposed, is the defendant entitled to a jury trial in the
former case if the statute permits a substantial fine or in either case if a substantial
fine is in fact imposed? On the aggregation problem, see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506 (1974) (aggregate jail sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment may
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inal contempt cases a judge must now either grant the defendant a
jury trial or limit the sanction to six months' imprisonment.40
Although the six-month qualification is not inconsistent with
the jury trial mandates of article III, section 2, and the sixth amendment, the Court initially grounded the right only on the Court's
supervisory power over federal criminal procedures.00 Two years
later the right was elevated to constitutional status.01
At a time when the notions of inherent judicial contempt power
and the sui generis character of contempt proceedings justified substantial procedural differences between criminal contempts and
ordin~ry criminal offenses, it would have been futile to suggest that
courts were not justified in exercising their inherent contempt
power.02 This was true even a few years ago, when a recalcitrant
grand jury witness could be convicted of contempt without a hearing and when no contemnor had the constitutional right to a jury
trial. Now, however, except for the limited category of cases within
rule 42(a), the only significant difference between procedures for
criminal contempts and for other criminal prosecutions is that the
former need not be initiated by information or grand jury indictment.03 It is therefore appropriate to ask to what extent the inherent
not be imposed for multiple contempts arising during a single trial, charged by a
single judge, and tried in a single proceeding). On the fine problem, see United
States v. R.L. Polle &: Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971) (fine cannot exceed $500 unless
defendant is given right to jury trial). But see Hoffman v. Local 10, Intl, Longshoremen's &: Warehousemen's Union, 492 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom.
Muniz v. Hoffman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (No. 73-1924). See also
In re Local 225, Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild, 476 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1973).
49. On the problems relating to prejudging the severity of the potential sentence,
see text at notes 227-29 infra,
50. Che.ff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966).
51. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Because Bloom arose out of a state court
contempt proceeding, its holding was necessarily based on the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment rather than the sixth amendment jury trial right. The
Court in Bloom, however, clearly indicated that it would reach the same result in
a federal contempt case. 391 U.S. at 209-10. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), suggesting that the scope of tl1e
due process right to a jury trial is the same as the scope of the sixth amendment
right.
52. The absence of procedural guarantees was of much more immediate concern
to contemnors, and anyone attempting to persuade a court to limit its power would
undoubtedly feel more secure analogizing contempts to other crimes for the purpose
of securing specific procedural rights than he would feel cllallenging the wellestablished doctrine of inherent power.
53. See text at notes 35-51 supra. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201·08
(1968).
There may be some other procedural differences, but they are relatively minor.
See United States v. Robinson, 449 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel.
Bowles v. Seidmon, 154 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1946); Conley v. United States, 59 F.2d
929 (8th Cir. 1932) (all indicating that notice to contemnor may be judged by stan•
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power rationale justifies a unique initiating process for criminal
contempts. In the absence of a sufficient justification, there is no
basis for treating criminal contempts as other than ordinary criminal
prosecutions-not because the right to an information or indictment
is fundamental, 64 but because, in the absence of any basis for characterizing criminal contempts as sui generis, they should be viewed as
ordinary criminal cases within the meaning of the fifth amendment's
guarantee of a grand jury indictment as well as all other constitutional55 and nonconstitutional56 provisions generally applicable to
crimes and criminal prosecutions.
<lards less strict than those applied to indictments). But see United States v. Schine,
125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954); Bowles v. Bullock, 5 F.R.D. 147 (D. Del. 1945).
See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 74 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
suggesting that pre-trial discovery may be more limited in contempt cases than in
ordinary criminal prosecutions. But cf. cases cited note 41 supra.
54. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
55. E.g., the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy and the sixth
amendment rights to counsel. See text at notes 179-84 infra (double jeopardy); text at
note 44 supra (right to counsel). ·
· ·
56. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 4, 5, 7(a), 9. Rule 7 provides for initiation of ordinary
criminal prosecutions by indictment or information, and rules 3 through 5 set forth
the complaint, summons, warrant, and initial appearance procedures for cases in
which the summons or warrant precedes the formal initiation of proceedings. Rule 9
deals with the form, execution, service, and return of summonses and warrants
issued after the return of an indictment or information.
Several courts have equated an application for an order to show cause with an
information. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 196 F.2d 895 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 829 (1952); Philippe v. Window Glass Cutters League, 99 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.
Ark. 1951). However, since a court presumably has discretion to deny the application
even if probable cause exists, see text at notes 62-63 infra, the application does not
represent a formal decision to proceed with the contempt action. Rather, the appli•
cation is more analogous to the filing of a criminal complaint, which may or may
not result in an official decision to prosecute. The critical issue is not, however,
the method by which the charge is made, but the method of making the formal
decision to act on the charge. If one rejects the premise that it is appropriate to
utilize the indictment or information process rather than rule 42 for the formal
initiation of criminal contempt cases, there would be no reason to utilize the charging procedures in rules 3 through 5. If the premise is accepted, as this article will
argue it should be, a major distinction that now exists between criminal contempt
proceedings and other criminal prosecutions will be eliminated, and failure to utilize
the same charging procedures would be inconsistent with the assimilation of criminal
contempt with other crimes.
The only potential problem in charging one with criminal contempt pursuant
to rules 3 through 5 would be the question of the applicability of the rule 5(c) preliminary examination provision. That provision, which grants to defendants the
right to a preliminary examination within 20 days of an initial appearance unless
an information or indictment is filed prior to the date set for the examination,
explicitly exempts petty offenses, and in the context of determining whether criminal
contemnors have a constitutional right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has taken
the position that contempts are petty unless the sentence actually imposed exceeds
six months' imprisonment. See text at notes 46-48 supra. This might suggest that
criminal contemnors need not be given a preliminary examination, but that the
failure to grant a preliminary examination in cases in which there is no indictment
or information within 20 days of the charge will limit the contemnor's potential
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ORDINARY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT POWER

If criminal contempts were treated for all purposes as ordinary
criminal prosecutions, there would be three important ramifications
for the current law of contempt:
·
First, although courts have maintained that the exercise of the
contempt power is not dependent upon authorizing legislation,07
the ordinary criminal prosecution of a contemnor would become
dependent upon the existence of a criminal statute proscribing his
conduct.58
Second, prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of criminal contempts would be transferred from the judiciary to the executive.
Only the public prosecutor has the discretionary power to initiate
or forgo an ordinary criminal prosecution.50 If he decides to proceed,
the court cannot dismiss the case without the prosecutor's consent
unless further proceedings would violate some legal mandate.00 In
penalty to a maximum of six months' imprisonment. This approach, however, might
represent an unwarranted infringement on judges' sentencing discretion. The deci•
sion to deny a jury trial and thus to limit the potential contempt sentence is made
by a judge, but the decision to deny a preliminary examination would be made by
a magistrate. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). Cf. text at notes 64-70 infra, discussing the
possible effect of extending the grand jury indictment right to criminal contemnors.
Unless one is willing to give magistrates this power, it would be desirable to amend
rule 5(c) to clarify whether the preliminary examination right applies to all criminal
contempts.
The possibility of serious contempt criminal penalties in some cases should be
a sufficient basis for extending the preliminary examination right to all criminal
contempts, and until rule 5(c) is so amended, it would be desirable for magistrates
to assume that criminal contempts are not petty offenses, if only to avoid potential
litigation over the issue. Since a defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination
only if proceedings are not formally initiated prior to the date set for the hearing,
it is not likely that extending the right to criminal contemnors will impose a
significant burden on the judicial system, If the contumacious conduct occurs in
the presence or is initially called to the attention of a prosecutor or grand jury,
it is likely that an information or indictment will be returned prior to the defendant's initial appearance, and thus there would be no right to a preliminary
examination. In cases in which the appearance occurs prior to the formal initia•
ation of proceedings, the prosecutor could follow the common practice of making
the preliminary examination right moot by formally initiating the case prior to
the date set for examination. See Hearings on the U.S. Commissioner System Before
the Subcomm. on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess, 127 (1965).
57. See cases cited note 2 supra.
58. There are no federal common-law crimes. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 73 (1923).
59. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963).
60. United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf, United States v.
Gray, 448 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1971).
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contrast, a court may now both initiate criminal contempt proceedings on its own motion61 and refuse a request to initiate proceedings despite probable cause to believe that the contempt
occurred.62 Furthermore, at least one case has held that a court may
dismiss a criminal contempt proceeding after its initiation without
the consent of the prosecutor on the basis of a discretionary determination that the dismissal is in the public interest. 63
Third, whereas the judiciary currently has complete discretion
over the severity of a contempt sanction,64 applying the fifth amendment's grand jury indictment provision to criminal contempts
would allow both prosecutors and grand juries to have an impact
on courts' sentencing discretion. 65 Since the right to an indictment
exists only for crimes for which the statutory penalty exceeds one
year's imprisonment,66 and since the Supreme Court in the jury trial
cases has been unwilling to view contempts as inherently nonpetty,67
the right to a grand jury indictment presumably would not exist
in all criminal contempt cases. However, just as the Court classified
contempts as petty or nonpetty on the basis of the penalty actually
imposed,68 it presumably would also look to the actual penalty to
determine the scope of the grand jury right. 69 Thus, a grand jury
61. In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d
306 {3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025 (1967): In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d 915,
917 {4th Cir. 1954), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 931 (1955); O'Malley v. United States, 128
F.2d 676 (8th Cir.), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States,
317 U.S. 412 (1942). Cf. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949) (civil
contempt).
62. In re Sylvester, 41 F.2d 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Ex parte McLeod, 120 F. 130
(N.D. Ala. 1903).
63. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965), criticized in Note, Criminal Contempt: Federal Court's Power To Dismiss Proceeding Before Trial, 66
COLUM, L. REV. 182 (1966).
.
64. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1958). Although the contemnor
cannot receive more than a six months' sentence without "a jury trial or waiver
thereof," Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966), it is the judge who has
the power to grant or deny that right. See 384 U.S. at 382 {Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. It would also result in some delay, but the delay would be no more consequential in criminal contempt cases than in other criminal prosecutions. In cases
now governed by rule 42{a), where immediate imposition of a penalty has been
viewed as important, see text at note 5 supra, sentences cannot exceed six months'
imprisonment. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209-10 (1968). Therefore, the indictment right would not apply.
·
66. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V {"capital, or otherwise infamous crimes"). See United
States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
67. See text at note 48 supra.
68. See text at note 48 supra.
69. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 161-62 (1968).
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(by refusing to return an indictment) or a prosecutor (by refusing
to seek or sign70 an indictment) could limit the potential maximum
penalty to one year's imprisonment, and as a practical matter the
limit could be imprisonment for six months. A judge perhaps would
be reluctant to expend judicial resources on a jury trial if to do so
would give him the option of adding only six months to the penalty
that he could othenvise impose.
The remainder of this article will examine the justifications for
continuing to treat criminal contempts differently from other
criminal prosecutions in terms of these three factors.

A. Independence of the Judiciary from the Legislature
The ·judiciary, as an independent branch of the government,
should have at least the powers necessary for it to function properly.71 These arguably include the power to define and determine
penalties for affronts to its authority, both in the absence of any
legislation proscribing contumacious conduct and also, perhaps, in
situations in which existing legislation either does not proscribe
certain conduct deemed contumacious by the judiciary or does not
provide a penalty adequate to vindicate the courts' authority. 72
Although the proposition that power to vindicate the courts' au.tliority through the imposition of criminal penalties must rest ultimately in the judiciary is not beyond dispute,78 it need not be challenged here. That proposition can justify independent judicial
action to define, initiate, and establish penalties for contempts only
70. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965).
·
,
71. Courts have claimed inherent power to regulate a number of activities that
are necessary for or related to the proper functioning of the judiciary, See, e.g.,
People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966) (inherent
power to order payment from public funds of indigent defendant's appointed counsel): State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961) (inherent
.power to regulate practice of law). See also Dowling, The Inherent Power of the
]udidary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts,
12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926): Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal
Courts, 53 GEO, L.J. 1050 (1965).
72. See, e.g., Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971) (contempt statute limiting
criminal penalty for refusal to testify to 30 dollars and 24 hours' imprisonment is
an unconstitutional legislative infringement on courts' contempt power).
73. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 284-308. Although Goldfarb does not deal
specifically with the issue of the source of the power, most of his recommendations
contemplate legislative action. He does suggest that courts should have a limited
inherent right to quell disruptions tlu'.ough use of the contempt power. Id, at 299300, 305-06. Even in these types of cases, however, the theoretical possibility that
Congress may refuse to enact appropriate legislation arguably does not outweigh
the danger that courts may not be sufficiently restrained in exercising a claimed
inherent. contempt power. See id. at 5-9. See also Green v. United States, 856 U.S.
165, 193-219 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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when the legislative provisions are inadequate, and that circumstance does not exist in the federal system. The Supreme Court ·has
recognized that Congress can regulate the contempt power, and the·
Court has approved the present congressional limitations oh · the
exercise of the power: The proscription in section 401 against imposing both a fine and a prison sentence is binding on the courts,74
and courts may not exercise their inherent power under rule 42 to
punish contumacious conduct that does not fall within the scope· of
section 401.75 Contempts that do fall within that section, however,
also may be initiated by indictment.76 Thus, judicial fear of dependence upon the legislature cannot justify treating section 401 contempts differently from other criminal prosecutions.77
The extent to which Congress could further limit the contempt
power is admittedly uncertain. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has never struck down any congressional regulation of the
contempt power, and, in fact, has suggested that Congress may have
considerable latitude in regulating the contempt power of the
circuit and district courts: "These courts were created by act of
Congress. Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling
them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their
jurisdiction. The act of 1831 [now section 401] is, therefore, to them
the law specifying the cases in which summary punishment for
contempts may be infl.icted." 78 On the other hand, the Court affirmed
74. In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943). Cf. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505, 512 (1873).
75. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-53 (1941).
76. See cases cited note 28 supra.
77. Several methods exist for implementing the goal of treating criminal contempts
as ordinary criminal prosecutions. For example, instead of abandoning reliance on the
inherent contempt power theory and holding that contempts should be viewed as ordinary crimes, the judiciary (retaining its claim to inherent contempt power) could exercise its discretion to refuse to initiate proceedings pursuant to rule 42 on the theory
that initiation by indictment is an adequate alternative. See text at notes 200-04 infra •.
Although existing legislation clearly permits this alternative, it is unclear whether
the legislation is sufficient· to allow courts entirely to· forgo reliance on the notion
of inherent contempt power. See text at notes 205-06 infra, suggesting that section
401 may be only a statement of·the courts' contempt power and that the indictment
precedents merely represent a judicial acquiescence in prosecutors' and grand juries'
requests for contempt proceedings. But see note 206 infra.
78. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873).
Since the Supreme Court, unlike other federal courts, derives its power from the
Constitution rather than from Congress, see U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1, Congress may
not be able to regulate the Court's contempt power at all, or at least not to the same
extent that it can regulate the contempt power of lower federal courts. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505, 510 (1873) (by implication); Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 8.
This suggested distinction between constitutionally created and legislatively created
courts has little practical bearing on the legislative power to regulate contempts in
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in the same case that "the power to punish for contempts is inherent
in all courts. " 79 Furthermore, the existing restrictions on the courts'
exercise of the contempt power are not substantial: Section 401
contains an extremely broad substantive definition of contempt80
and prescribes no maximum penalty.
If the Court continues to maintain that the need to impose
immediate penalties for contempts now punishable pursuant to rule
42(a) outweighs granting even the minimal due process protections
of prior notice and hearing,81 it is doubtful that the Court would
condone a congressional attempt to eliminate this summary power.
Similarly, the Court may be reluctant to accept amendments to
section 401 that would leave some types of contumacious behavior
unpunishable.82 Hopefully, however, the Court would not object to
the imposition of reasonable maximum penalties for various types
of contumacious conduct now governed by section 401,88 or to
limitations on the possible use of rule 42(b) through the enactment
of legislation that restricts the substantive scope of section 401 but
allows conduct now covered by that section to be treated as an ordinary criminal offense.84 The 1831 contempt legislation provides a
the federal system. The Supreme Court has exercised its contempt power only once,
See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). The distinction, however, has im•
portant implications for the power of state legislatures to regulate the contempt
power of state trial courts, many of which are constitutionally created, See Kuhns,
Revising a State Judicial Article: Issues for the North Dakota Constitutional Convention, 48 N.D. L. R.Ev. 219, 225-26 (1972), Since the reasons for deciding whether
to give a state court constitutional status are generally unrelated to the contempt
regulation question, id. at 225-26, 236, the mere fact that a court was established
by the state constitution rather than by the legislature does not necessarily justify
limiting the extent to which its contempt power may be regulated.
79. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
80, Falco, Federal Criminal Contempts and the Proposed New Federal Criminal
Code, 11 AM. CRIM. L, R.Ev. 429, 432-33 (1973).
81, See note 34 supra.
82, Some types of conduct presently within section 401 arc punishable under
other criminal statutes. For example, attempting to influence or bribe a juror is both
a specific criminal offense and a section 401 contempt. Compare Kong v. United
States, 216 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1954) (criminal prosecution for violation of 18 U,S.C,
§ 1503), with Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 223 (D.C, Cir, 1946), cert, denied,
331 U.S. 840 (1947) (contempt prosecution under 28 U.S.C, § 385 (1940), as amended,
28 u.s.c. § 401 (1970)).
83. See NATIONAL COMMN. ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAws, PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIJIIINAL CODE § 1341 (1971) [hereinafter PROP, FED, CRIM, CODE],
84, It is important to distinguish between these two types of legislation, On the
one hand, the mere imposition of maximum penalties for violations of section 401
or the enactment of several statutes patterned after section 401 that define the
courts' contempt power and prescribe various penalties for different types of conduct
would appear not to affect the courts' initiating discretion or the availability of rule
42. The maximum penalty provisions, however, presumably would- determine whether
the contemnor would be entitled to a jury trial, See note 47 supra. On the other
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precedent for the latter type of regulation,85 and 18 U.S.C. § 402
provides a limited precedent for legislative imposition of maximum
contempt penalties.86 Neither type of legislation would appear to
infringe upon the judiciary's interest in protecting its capacity to
hand, eliminating from the scope of section 401 conduct proscribed by other existing
or concurrently enacted statutes that do not explicitly refer to the courts' contempt
power would appear to represent a congressional judgment to limit the substantive
scope of that power. Proceedings for violations of these statutes presumably could
be initiated only by information or indictment, and the penalty provision of any
such statute would determine not only whether the defendant is entitled to a jury
trial, but also whether he is entitled to a grand jury indictment.
The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code recommends an unusual and somewhat
puzzling combination of these two types of regulation. See PROP, FED. CRIM. CODE,
supra note 83, §§ 1341-49. Section 1341, the basic criminal contempt statute, retains
the substantive definition of the court's contempt power currently contained in section 401, but imposes a six-month maximum prison sentence. Presumably, proceedings for violations of this section could be initiated pursuant to rule 42. See WORKING
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 601-03. The next four sections define as specific criminal
offenses and provide slightly different ma.ximum penalties for conduct that, to a
substantial extent, also comes under section 1341: failure to appear (§ 1342); refusal
to testify (§ 1343); hindering proceedings by disruptive conduct (§ 1344); and disobedience of a judicial order (§ 1345). Proceedings for violations of these sections
apparently could be initiated only by information or indictment. See PROP. FED.
CRThl. CODE, supra, § 1349; comments to id. §§ 1342-49. These provisions, however,
apparently are not intended to limit the substantive scope of section 1341, see WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 610-11, 614-15, 621, 624, 625-26, and with limited exceptions,
prosecutions for violations of these sections could not be initiated without judicial
certification that the case is an appropriate one to consider for prosecution. PROP.
FED. CRIM. CODE, supra, § 1349; WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 625-26. Furthermore, if
such a certification is accompanied by a recommendation for prosecution, section
1349 requires the public prosecutor to proceed with the case. The stated reason
for the certification requirement is to allow the judiciary to retain initiating discretion over contempts. WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 625-26.
Of the number of questions raised by these proposed statutes, see Falco, supra
note 80; cf. note 213 infra, one is of particular concern for the purposes of this
article: Is tl1e requirement of prior judicial certification for the initiation of proceedings under sections 1342-45 an implicit rejection of the precedent for allowing
initiation of criminal contempt proceedings by indictment without prior judicial
approval? See note 28 supra and accompanying text. But cf. text at notes 205-06 infra.
Although neither the Proposed Code nor the Working Papers specifically addresses
this question, an affirmative an5'ver would be consistent with the Code's general
sclleme of maintaining judicial control over the initiating decision. If the an5'ver
is affirmative, and if the proposed contempt provisions are adopted in their present
form, they will have the undesirable consequence of perpetuating a basic and largely
unnecessary distinction between criminal contempts and other crimes.
85. See text at notes 15-17 supra.
86. See note 25 supra. In a brief comment affirming that Congress can regulate
the contempt power, the Supreme Court in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 n.1
(1968), stated that Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
&: Omaha Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924), had upheld the constitutionality of both the jury
trial and maxinmm penalty provisions of section 402. Michaelson, however, dealt solely
with the jury trial provision, and although there is no reason to believe that the
Court would not also have upheld the penalty provision, it is important_ to note that
Michaelson stressed that section 402 covered only limited types of contempts, thereby
implying that a similar jury trial-and perhaps maximum penalty-provision applicable
to all contempts might not be upheld. 266 U.S. at 66-67. But cf. text at note 78 supra.
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function as an independent branch of the government,87 and as the
following analysis will suggest, such legislative regulation would be
beneficial. 88
There is no certainty that Congress would limit itself to these
types of regulation or that the judiciary would reaffirm the view
that Congress may impose substantial limits on the contempt power.
However, the precedent for judicial deference to congressional
action, and the fact that Congress has not in the past attempted
unreasonably to restrict the contempt power, suggest that the judiciary probably will not be forced to confront Congress over the
question whether the inherent power rationale or the sui generis
character of the contempt offense limits Congress' power to legislate
in this area. In any event, the fact remains that, at least for the
present, the need for judicial independence from the legislature is
not a valid basis for refusing to treat criminal contempts as ordinary criminal prosecutions.
B. Independence of the Judiciary from the Executive: Initiation

Since treating contempts as ordinary criminal prosecutions would
transfer prosecutorial discretion in criminal contempt cases from
the judiciary to the executive,89 it is important to consider whether
the judiciary has an interest that justifies reserving to itself the
power to decide whether to initiate criminal contempt proceedings.
Four factors, one or more of which may exist in any contempt
situation, suggest that the judiciary may have such an interest: (1) an
asserted need for immediate action pursuant to rule 42(a) when the
conduct occurs in the immediate view of the court; (2) the notion
that the judiciary is the party injured by the conduct; (3) the theory
that contumacious conduct that violates a court order is qualitatively
different from violations of criminal statutes; and (4) the fear that
the public prosecutor will not be sufficiently responsive to contempts
87. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26.
88. See text at notes 205-13, 249-56 infra.
89. In light of recent criminal and political activities commonly referred to as
the Watergate scandal, see C. BERNSI"EIN &: B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S l\fEN
(1974), it may appear unreasonable to suggest that any additional powers should
be given to the executive branch. The following analysis, which argues that prosecutorial discretion over criminal contempts should rest with the executive rather
than the judiciary, is based solely on the premise that criminal contempts should
be treated as are all other criminal prosecutions. The analysis does not address itself
to and does not intend to imply any conclusions about the extent to or manner in
which prosecutorial discretion in general should be regulated or insulated from
executive political control. See also note 100 infra.
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of the courts' authority. The analysis here will be limited to a consideration of the last three factors. 90

I. Injury to the Judiciary
The fact that the purpose of the criminal contempt sanction is to
vindicate the courts' authority implies that injury to judicial authority is a necessary condition for a court's initiation of contempt
proceedings. In contempt cases, however, courts are often injured
parties only in a secondary sense. For example, when an individual
disobeys a court order to testify, the most immediate injury is to the
party that would have benefited from the testimony. If the fact of
injury is a relevant criterion for allocating discretion to initiate
criminal contempts, the court's interest arguably is not as great as
the interest of the person for whose benefit the order was granted.
In some situations (e.g., when court proceedings are physically
disrupted or, perhaps, when an individual refuses to appear before
a court or grand jury) the court itself may appropriately be viewed
as the primary injured party. Yet, even in these situations, the fact
of injury, although it may be a necessary condition for invocation
of the contempt power, is not a sufficient basis for giving the judiciary power to decide whether to initiate criminal contempt proceedings: The right to invoke proceedings that may lead to a
punitive sanction is one appropriately exercised in the public interest and not for personal vindication.91 The only federal precedent
90. It would be possible to require that contempts now punishable without prior
notice or hearing pursuant to rule 42(a) also be initiated by the executive. However, even if prosecutors were generally responsive to requests from judges for the
initiation of contempt proceedings in these cases, such a requirement could entail
an arguably unwarranted delay. It is true that contemnors subject to punishment
without a hearing presumably would not be entitled to a grand jury indictment, see
note 65 supra, and the preparation and filing of an information often could be
completed in a few minutes. Still, if the need for immediate action is sufficient to
justify denying a hearing, the risk of delay might override considerations favoring
executive initiation.
An additional argument for not requiring executive initiation of such contempts
concerns the danger of establishing a precedent denying a hearing to a defendant
in a case that appears, at least at the outset, to be an ordinary criminal prosecution.
That precedent might be used in other contexts to suspend or modify defendants'
rights on the basis of an asserted need for immediate punishment, the fact that
the judge personally observed the criminal conduct, or some similar factor. To avoid
any potential erosion of procedural rights in other criminal prosecutions, it would
be preferable either to eliminate completely the possibility of summarily imposing
a contempt penalty or to maintain the unique rule 42(a) procedure.
91. See generally Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &: Enginemen v. United
States, 411 F.2d 312, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171,
182-83, 190-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193
F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To
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suggesting a contrary view is the inherent power claimed by Congress to punish contempts of its authority. 92 The validity of the
congressional claim to this power, however, is not beyond dispute. 93
If the power does exist, it arguably is only a coercive power analogous to the judiciary's coercive civil contempt power.04 Moreover,
since the rationale for exercising inherent contempt power is necessity, any support that the congressional precedent may appear to
give to the claim that injured parties should be able to initiate
contempt proceedings is undermined by the fact that Congress in
recent years has not attempted to exercise the power.ml Rather,
contempts of Congress are dealt with as ordinary criminal
prosecutions.96
Even if one were to conclude that all contempts injure the judiciary and that injured parties generally should be able to initiate
criminal proceedings, this should not be a sufficient basis for allowing th~ judiciary to initiate criminal contempt proceedings. The
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the ability of the
judiciary to punish an affront to its authority poses a danger that the
judgment may be unduly vindictive or based on a distorted view of
the gravity of the offense: Rule 42(b) provides that "[i]f the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing ...." 07
Rule 42(b), however, does not offer protection against a judge's
possible institutional bias, and to the extent that institutional injury
is the rationale for treating contempts uniquely, the potential for
institutional bias may be increased.
Whether institutional biases would be mitigated merely by placing the initiating function with the executive is admittedly open to.
CHARGE A SUSPECT ·wrrH A Cru11m 9-10 (1969); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW &: CONTEllfi'. PROB, 64 (1948}, But cf. Comment,
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65
YALE L.J. 209 (1955).
92. See generally C. BECK, CoNTEJ\fPT OF CONGRESS (1959); R. GOLDFARB, supra note
2, at 40-43.
93. The Supreme Court has approved of the congressional exercise of inherent
contempt power. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). But see C. BECK,
supra note 92, at 3-5; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 25-30,
94. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821). See also Quinn
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 169 (1955). On the distinction between criminal and
civil contempt, see text at notes 149-61 infra.
95. See R, GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 43,
96. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), See
also notes 212-13 infra and accompanying text, discussing the statutory obligation of
the prosecutor to present contempts of Congress to a grand jury._
97. Cf. cases cited note 100 infra.
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question. The prosecutor's close professional contact with the courts
may make him reluctant to refuse a judge's request that he initiate a
contempt action.98 Still, the requirement of an independent, executive initiating decision would provide at least a theoretical check
against possible bias, and, more importantly, the absence of any such
check on judicial power, both to initiate proceedings against and
to convict individuals who affront judicial authority, gives the
exercise of contempt power the appearance of being potentially
arbitrary and unfair. Unless there are other overriding considerations,99 the initiating power over criminal contempts should be
removed from the judiciary, if only to ensure that "justice ... satisfy
the appearance of fairness." 100
•
98. Alfred A. Arraj, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, has established a policy of having criminal contempts initiated
by indictment because the order to shqw cause may not inform the defendant of
the charge against him with the same degree of specificity as would an indictment.
Cf. note 53 supra. Although only a few criminal contempt cases have arisen since
the policy was instituted, federal prosecutors have not refused to seek an indictment
in any case called to their attention by the court, and Judge Arraj expressed the
view that such a refusal would be highly unlikely in light of the close working
relationship between the court and the prosecutors. Interview with Judge Arraj,
November 21, 1973, Denver, Colo. Federal prosecutors in Denver confirmed this view,
and prosecutors in otl_ler cities agreed that the process of initiating criminal con•
tempts by indictment would not be likely to create conflicts betl\'een the court and
the prosecutor's office. See note 134 infra.
99. See note 90 supra.
100. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). See also Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488, 501 (1974); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 578 (1964); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 198-99 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955);
R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 254-57.
In some situations there is arguably an equal or greater potential for unfairness
if the public prosecutor is vested with initiating discretion over criminal contempts.
For example, when a prosecutor decides to initiate a contempt prosecution against
a recalcitrant grand jury witness, the prosecutor, because of his direct interest in the
grand jury proceedings, may be acting, or may appear to be acting, on purely vindictive motives. This possibility, however, should not be regarded as a sufficient basis
for retaining initiating discretion over criminal contempts with the judiciary for at
least three reasons. First, in terms of the appearance of fairness, retaining initiating
discretion with the judiciary does not solve the problem but only maintains the
appearance of judicial unfairness. Second, to the extent that one is concerned with
actual unfairness or abuse of discretion by the prosecutor, retaining initiating discretion with the judiciary is not likely to be an effective remedy. See text at notes
144-48 infra. Third, the potential for prosecutorial unfairness or the appearance of
unfairness may exist not only in some contempt cases but in any cases in which the
prosecutor has or appears to have a personal or institutional interest in the proceedings. For example, the danger of unfairness on the part of $e prosecutor is no
greater in the case of a grand jury witness who refuses to testify than in the case
of a grand jury witness who appears to commit perjury or in any case in which a
member of the prosecutor's office is the victim of some criminal act.
The appropriate resolution of this problem is not to deprive the public prosecutor of initiating discretion over criminal contempts, but to develop standards and
methods for regulating the prosecutor's discretionary power in all cases. See generally K. DAVIS, D1s~RETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); F. MILLER, supra note 91. The general
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2. The Unique Nature of a Court Order
Many criminal contempt cases result from the contemnor's
refusal to obey a court order,101 and in one important respect the
violation of a court order generally is treated differently from the
violation of a criminal statute: If the statute is invalid, the invalidity
will require the defendant's acquittal.102 If a court order is invalid,
its violation may nonetheless be treated as contempt,103 except where
the court lacks jurisdiction to issue the order104 or, perhaps, where
the defendant has no opportunity to contest the validity of the
order.105 Thus, in Walker v. City of Birmingham,100 the Supreme
Court upheld the criminal contempt convictions of civil rights
marchers who violated an injunction against demonstrating even
though the language of the injunction-the validity of which was
deemed collateral to the contempt proceeding and therefore not
necessary to determine107-"might be subject to substantial constitutional question."108 Had the defendants been convicted of violatproblem of controlling prosecutorial discretion is beyond the scope of this article,
Professor Davis, however, suggests the possible desirability of judicial review of decisions not to prosecute, K. DAVIS, supra, at 224·25, and the analysis here has argued
that the judiciary is a particularly inappropriate body to exercise discretionary power
to decide whether criminal contempt proceedings should be initiated. If federal
courts develop the doctrine that refusals to prosecute are subject to judicial review,
the question arises as to whether that doctrine should apply to criminal contempts
as well as to other crimes. The answer should probably be affirmative-at least if the
scope of judicial review is limited. Since the focus of inquiry would be on abuse
of discretion rather than on injury to the judiciary, the potential for judicial bias
or the appearance of unfairness probably would be minimal.
101. E.g., Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (enforcement of administra,
tive agency's subpoena); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (refusal to testify
before grand jury); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (labor dispute).
102. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Lovell v,
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921),
Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953).
103. If the court has jurisdiction to issue the order, the validity of the order
cannot be collaterally attacked in a criminal contempt proceeding. Maness v. Meyers,
43 U.S.L.W. 4143, 4146-47 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922);
Western Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1943), See Cox, The
Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. CHI, L. R.Ev. 86 (1948); Rodgers, The Elusive
Search for the Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal Contempt Pro•
ceedings, 49 B.U. L. R.Ev. 251 (1969); Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HAnv,
L. R.Ev. 626 (1970).
104. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887): Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1885). See
articles cited note 103 supra; Maness v. Meyers, 43 U.S.L.W. 4143 (U.S. Jan. 15,
1975).
105. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318-19; Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1481, 1555-72 (1970).
106. 388 U.S. 307 (1967),
107. 388 U.S. at 313-14, 320. Cf. note 103 supra,
108. 388 U.S. at 317, Justices Douglas, Warren, Brennan, and Fortas thought the
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ing the parade ordinance on which the injunction was based, the
invalidity of the ordinance would have required reversal.109 However, since the trial court "[w]ithout question" had jurisdiction to
issue the injunction,11° the contempt convictions were affirmed. The
Court suggested that it might have reached the opposite conclusion
only if the contemnors had not had an adequate opportunity to seek
judicial review of the order prior to its violation.111
Although this distinction between the consequences of violating
invalid statutes and violating invalid court orders bears no necessary
relationship to the process by which proceedings are initiated for
either type of violation, it does suggest that the duty to obey court
orders is more pervasive than the duty to obey statutes,112 and to the
injunction was clearly unconstitutional. 388 U.S. at 334 (dissenting opinion). See also
note 109 infra.
109. Two years after its decision in Walker, the Court unanimously reversed the
convictions of defendants who had been prosecuted for violating the Birmingham
parade ordinance. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
BO. 388 U.S. at 315.
lll. 388 U.S. at 318-19.
ll2. See Bickel, Civil Disobedience and the Duty To Obey, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 199
(1973).
Professor Bickel draws a basic distinction between the duty to obey legislative
commands and the duty to obey adjudicatory commands. Violations of legislative
mandates, he contends, may sometimes be justified as legitimate acts of "law formation." Id. at 200. This would be the case, for example, if one violated a statute he
thought was unconstitutional. Our legal system legitimizes this type of law violation
by not punishing the violator if his theory of the law ultimately prevails. Id. at
200-01, 203. In contrast, Professor Bickel asserts that there is no justification for
disobeying an adjudicatory mandate. For example, with regard to the defendants in
Walker, he says:
If one is not under a moral obligation to obey at this point [after the issuance
of the injunction], then the very possibility of any legal order at all •.• is
placed in the gravest doubt. • • • Lack of assent to, and widespread disobedience
of, a general law • • • may be a legitimate way of questioning it • • • • But
disobedience of a court's judgment does not question the judgment, for it is, in
theory and in practice, irreversible. Here disobedience questions the very legal
order itself, which must in the end rest on something more than its power to
coerce.
Id. at 212-13.
Although Professor Bickel relies heavily on the normative legal distinction between
violations of invalid statutes and violations of invalid court orders, he does not rely
on it exclusively to define the scope of what he considers legitimate law violation.
For example, whereas an invalid criminal statute may be violated with impunity
regardless of the violator's motives, Professor Bickel contends that such law violation
is appropriate only if the violator acts "on grounds of moral or political principle,''
id. at 208, and he states that there "must, overall, be an imbalance on the side of
obedience.'' Id. at 214. Professor Bickel, however, is less clear in distinguishing bet\veen the moral duty and the legal duty to obey court orders. For example, after
citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922), for the proposition that even
an invalid court order must be obeyed, he states that "[o]nly when the court's claim
to authority is transparently frivolous, 'when a court is so obviously travelling outside
its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities'; only then, in the
case of an 'indisputable want of authority on the part of a court,' may an order
be disobeyed.'' Id. at 212, quoting United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 309-10 (Frank·
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extent that such a duty exists, there may be a symbolic value in utilizing different initiating procedures for the two types of violations. The
analysis here will suggest that there may be no unique legal or
moral duty to obey court orders, and that, even if such a duty exists,
it should have no bearing on how contempt proceedings are initiated.
In Walker the Court implied that a contempt sanction for
violating an invalid injunction may be justified by the fact that the
mandate was issued by a court: "[I]n the fair administration of
justice no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his
station, however righteous his motives . . . . [R]espect for judicial
process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which
alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom.'' 113 It is
not clear, however, that the duty to obey invalid mandates rests
O

furter, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Cf. Cox, supra note 103, at 109. To the
extent that this statement is meant to be descriptive, it is inaccurate in two respects.
First, it does not take account of the suggestion in Walker that lack of opportunity
to challenge a court order may be a defense in a contempt proceeding to punish the
violation, and, second, transparent frivolity has not been the exclusive test for deter•
mining whether a court has jurisdiction to issue the order. See cases cited note 118
infra; Cox, supra note 103, at 108. To the extent that Professor Bickel's statement
is intended as one of moral principle, it leaves unanswered the question why such
a duty should exist if there is no opportunity to challenge the validity of the order,
see note 114 infra, or if there are reasonable grounds for challenging the court's
jurisdiction. See text at notes 117-23 infra.
Since it is not clear whether Professor Bickel intended his statement to be one
of moral principle, and since even the recognition of a greater moral or legal duty
to obey court orders would not justify a unique initiating procedure for criminal
contempts, see text at and following notes 125-26 infra, it is not necessary to dwell
further on the nature and scope of the moral duty to obey court orders. The following analysis, however, will suggest that the legal duty to obey, as evidenced by
the legal consequences of violating an invalid mandate, may not depend upon whether
the mandate is legislative or adjudicatory, See notes 114-15 infra and accompanying
text. If there is no unique legal duty to obey invalid court orders, the bases upon
which Professor Bickel relies to support his distinction between the duty to obey
adjudicatory mandates and the duty to obey legislative mandates would appear to be
substantially undermined. Thus, in fairness to Professor Bickel, it is important to point
out two factors that suggest that his views regarding the duty to obey are not necessarily
inconsistent with the views expressed in this article. First, although he makes no explicit
reference to the lack of opportunity for review dictum in Walker, he describes court orders as "final judicial decree[s] ••• issued against named individuals, following a trial to
which they were parties," Bickel, supra, at 211 (emphasis added). Arguably, the italicized
words define at least an implicit limitation on the scope of the duty to obey judicial or•
ders. Second, although Professor Bickel's use of the term "law formation" to describe
legitimate law violation and his reservation of that term for violations of nonad•
judicatory mandates perhaps implies an exaggerated notion of the duty to obey court
orders, the primary thesis of his article is not that all court orders must be obeyed,
but that a commitment to the rule of law does not entail a moral duty to obey all
laws. Id. at 211, 214. The establishment of this thesis does not require a detailed
analysis of the scope of the duty to obey all adjudicatory mandates, and presumably
Professor Bickel did not intend his observations to pass for such an analysis,
113. 388 U.S. at 320-21 (footnote omitted), But cf, In re Berry, 68 Ca]. 2d 137,
436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
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solely, or even primarily, on whether they are of judicial ongm.
Rather, the critical issue may be whether there is an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the mandate prior to its violation. As
noted previously, the Walker Court suggested that it might have
reached a different result if the contemnors had not had an. adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the injunction,114 and
it is arguable that the adequacy of pre-violation judicial review is114. See text at note 111 supra. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945),
reversing a contempt conviction on first amendment grounds where the defendant
had made a speech in violation of an invalid restraining order served only hours
before the speech was to be delivered. The injunction in Thomas had been issued
to enforce a state statute requiring labor organizers to obtain a permit prior to
soliciting membership, and in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the contempt
conviction, the state supreme court considered and rejected the merits of Thomas'
constitutional claim, thereby implicitly disregarding any legal distinction between a
violation of the statute and a violation of the injunction. Ex parte Thomas, 141
Tex. 591, 174 S.W.2d 958 (1943). The United States Supreme Court, recognizing that
the case did not raise an issue of the state court's jurisdiction to issue an invalid
order, treated the case as if the defendant had been prosecuted for violating the
registration statute. 323 U.S. at 524-25 &: n.7. Without relying specifically on the time
factor, the Court reversed the conviction because the injunction represented an
unconstitutional application of the statute. Thus, it is arguable that Thomas stands
for the proposition that one may violate an unconstitutionally applied statute regardless of the availability of judicial remedies to test the validity of the application.
Cf. Blasi, supra note 105, at 1562. Two factors, however, suggest that this is not an
appropriate reading of Thomas. First, Justice Rutledge, the author of the plurality
opinion, indicated in a later case that Thomas turned in large part on the lack of
opportunity for judicial review. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 351-52 (1947)
(dissenting opinion). Second, in Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), the
Court upheld the conviction of a defendant who violated a valid registration ordinance that had been unconstitutionally applied to him.
In Poulos the defendant had been arbitrarily denied a permit to hold a religious
meeting, and although there were six weeks between the initial denial and the date
scheduled for the meeting, the defendant decided to proceed with the meeting
rather than pursue available remedies to challenge the denial. The majority mistakenly distinguished Thomas as a case holding the statutory scheme invalid on its
face rather than as applied, see Blasi, supra, at 1561-62, and there is no explicit
reliance on the fact that there were six weeks in which the defendant could have
sought judicial review of the permit denial. Nonetheless, the Court's justification for
the decision, which is strikingly similar to its justification for Walker, see text at
note 11~ supra, suggests that opportunity for judicial review is a critical factor in
determining whether it is appropriate to resort to self-help in the face of an unconstitutionally applied mandate, whether or not the mandate is judicial: "[T)he
expense and annoyance of litigation is a price citizens must pay for life in an
orderly society where the Rights of the First Amendment have a real and abiding meaning." 345 U.S. at 409. Cf. Blasi, supra, at 1568-72; Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
For other cases suggesting that at least a limited opportunity for judicial review
may be a prerequisite to punishment for contempt in many circumstances, see
Carroll v. President &: Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); In re Green,
369 U.S. 689 (1962), discussed in Walker, 388 U.S. at 315 n.6 (majority opinion),
332-33 n.9 (Warren, C.J., dissenting), and in 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 517, 522 (1968); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Alexander v. United States, 201
U.S. 117, 121 (1906); United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1971); Carlson
v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1954). See also 3 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE &: PROCEDURE § 702, at 151-52 (1969, Supp. 1974).
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or at least should be-determinative of whether an invalid statute
may be violated ·with impunity.115
The extent to which availability of prior judicial review explains
the consequences that :flow from violating an invalid mandate is
admittedly uncertain. The Supreme Court has never upheld a conviction based on a void statute, nor has it clarified its dictum in
Walker. 116 However, even if one concedes that there is or should be
a unique duty to obey court orders, it is important to note that the
legal duty to obey an invalid judicial mandate exists only if the
court has jurisdiction to issue the order. 117 Courts consistently have
held that a judge lacks jurisdiction to order testimony that would
violate a witness' privilege against self-incrimination,118 and in the
115. The availability of pre-violation review of a statute may often be inadequate
regardless of the scope of review, merely because it is unreasonable to expect a
potential criminal defendant to utilize the revie-1v procedures, See Note, Declaratory
Relief in the Criminal LaVJ, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1490, 1502-03 (1967). Where, however,
the state has a legitimate interest in regulating conduct through, for example, a statutory licensing or permit scheme, the necessity for utilizing those procedures arguably
should not depend upon whether the statutory scheme is void on its face, but upon the
adverse effect that compliance would entail. Cf. note 116 infra. While invalidity of the
statutory scheme should be considered in deciding whether the opportunity for review
was adequate, it should not necessarily be conclusive. See Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), referred to in note 109 supra, where Justice Harlan
based his concurring opinion specifically on the inadequacy of the opportunity for
review and not on the facial invalidity of the statute. 394 U.S. at 159-64. See also
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV, L. REv. 518, 548-51 (1970).
116. In some instances it might be appropriate to punish an individual for violating an order even if there is no opportunity for judicial review. For example,
violating a particular court order might substantially alter the position of the person
for whose benefit it was issued, whereas obeying the injunction, even if invalid or
beyond the court's jurisdiction, would not have a substantial adverse effect on the
party enjoined. See, e.g., Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of Carpenters 8: Joiners,
308 F. Supp. 172 (1969), affd., 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858
(1971). Cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 311 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Alternatively, there may be situations in which the rights infringed upon by
the issuance of an invalid order are so important that one should be allowed to
resort to self-help regardless of the opportunity for judicial review. See Maness v.
Meyers, 43 U.S.L.W. 4143, 4147 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1975). But cf. 43 U.S.L.W at 4151
(White, J., concurring); Blasi, supra note 105, at 1563.
If opportunity for judicial review is a prerequisite to the punishment of those who
violate invalid court orders, the question remains as to how extensive the opportunity
should be. For the proposition that the adequacy of the scope of revie-1v should
turn in part on the nature of the rights infringed upon by the invalid order, see
Blasi, supra, at 1559-72.
117. See cases cited note 104 supra.
118. The thought of punishing a witness for refusing to obey an order that violates the privilege against self-incrimination is apparently so abhorrent to courts
that they rarely bother to mention the question of jurisdiction and instead proceed
immediately to the merits of the fifth amendment claim. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). But see
Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 226 (1st Cir, 1954) (criminal contempt) (court
order violative of witness' fifth amendment right is not a "lawful order" within the
meaning of section 401(3)); Foot v. Buchanan, 113 F. 156, 158 (C.C.N.D. Miss. 1902)
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numerous recalcitrant witness contempt cases involving valid fifth
amendment claims,119 the practical effect has been to treat violations
of orders to testify no differently than violations of statutes.120 In
addition, although contemnors' jurisdictional challenges have seldom
prevailed in non-witness cases,121 courts have not been consistent in
distinguishing between orders that are merely invalid and orders
that are beyond a court's jurisdiction.122 In situations in which this
inconsistency raises a colorable claim of lack of jurisdiction-regardless of the legal consequences of violating the order-there
would appear at least to be no unique moral obligation to obey the
mandate merely because it is judicial. If one is justified in violating
a statute to obtain judicial review of its constitutionality,123 he
should be equally justified in violating a court order to obtain
review of the question of jurisdiction.
Despite present uncertainties over the nature of the duty to obey
invalid judicial mandates, courts may begin to focus more clearly
on the concept of jurisdiction and the relevance of an opportunity
for pre-violation judicial review. If, as a result, it becomes clear that
violations of invalid court orders-but not invalid statutes-are
generally punishable, there is arguably a symbolic value in having a
unique initiating procedure for ~ontempts based on violations of
court orders. Recognition of the principle that it is not appropriate
to disobey court orders is particularly important in a society that
openly condones violations of invalid legislative mandates. Especially if one perceives that those who may be prone to use self-help
to advance their goals do not understand or appreciate this principle,
a separate initiating process for criminal contempts may seem to be
an appropriate, although admittedly somewhat obscure, device to
(civil contempt) ("Any exercise of jurisdiction or power violative of [the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination] is· void, and the witness imprisoned by an
order made in excess of the court's authority is entitled to be discharged • • • .").
For the proposition that an order is "lawful" within the meaning of the contempt statute unless the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it, see Cox, supra note
103, at 87. Cf. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 361 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 517, 520 (1968).
119. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Cusson, 132
F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1942).
120. It is perhaps not inappropriate to regard the defendants in these cases as
engaging in legitimate acts of law formation. See note 112 supra.
121. See, e.g., cases cited note 103 supra.
122. See Cox, supra note 103; Rodgers, supra note 103.
123. See note 112 supra.
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illustrate the distinction between violations of court orders and
violations of statutes.
The potential illustrative or symbolic value of a separate initiating process for criminal contempts also may assist in the development of criteria for determining whether to initiate contempt proceedings. The administration of criminal justice in general would
be qualitatively improved if prosecutorial discretion were exercised
on the basis of specified, articulable criteria.124 Even if the executive
and the judiciary would exercise prosecutorial discretion in contempt cases in a similar manner, the criteria for the exercise of that
discretion arguably should be different in some respects from the
criteria utilized in determining whether to initiate an ordinary
criminal prosecution. For example, if a statute is so frequently
violated that it no longer represents community values, or if an
individual openly violates a law he thinks is invalid in order to express his view that the law should be changed, a prosecutor might
appropriately decide that the law is so questionable or the violator's
motives so righteous that criminal prosecution is inappropriate.
These factors, however, are arguably irrelevant when one violates
a court order, at least if the court's jurisdiction to issue the order is
clear. Instead, in the case of a court order violation, it may be appropriate to consider such factors as the extent of the violator's
opportunity for judicial review in light of the detriment to him
from obeying the order and the use or availability of the civil
contempt sanction to deal with the conduct. The development
and articulation of such differing criteria may be advanced by allocating initiating discretion to separate institutional bodies.
Apart from practical, political considerations, which will be
discussed in the following section120 and which may exist regardless
of the legal effect of violating ~n invalid court order, a separate
initiating process for criminal contempts based on the unique
nature of court orders can be justified only because of its symbolic
value, and this is not a sufficient justification for at least two reasons.
First, the symbolic value with respect to the development of initiating criteria is at best speculative: Prosecutors develop and
utilize differing initiating criteria for different types of crimes,120
124. See ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUI'ION FUNCTION § 2.5 (1971): PRESIDENT'S
COMMN. ON I.AW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSI'ICE, TASK FORCE ON
THE COURTS 7-8 (1967).
125. See text at notes 127-48 infra.
126. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 NW, U. L. REV.
174 (1965).
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and there is no reason to expect that they would be less likely to
make relevant distinctions in the contempt area. In addition, there
is no evidence to suggest that judicial initiation of contempts has
contributed to the articulation of initiating criteria in the past, and
there is no reason to expect that it will in the future.
The symbolic value to the potential contemnor is at least as
questionable: The mere fact that a contempt proceeding may be
initiated by the court without information or indictment is unlikely to enhance the contemnor's understanding of the duty to
obey a court order. I£ the unique initiating procedure has any
impact on him, it is more likely to be a perception that he can be
deprived of rights available to other criminal defendants. This raises
the second problem ·with allowing judicial initiation of criminal
contempts for symbolic purposes-the appearance of unfairness.
Just as maintaining integrity and the appearance of integrity in the
judicial proce~s should be a sufficient reason to reject the fact of
injury rationale for allowing judicial initiation of criminal contempts, it should be a sufficient reason to reject a rationale based
on speculative symbolic considerations.

3. Practical Considerations

.
Perhaps the strongest argument for retaining discretion to initiate criminal contempts in the judiciary is a practical one. Criminal contempt cases would represent only a small portion of the business
in a prosecutor's office,127 and any injury from a contempt often
might seem less serious to the prosecutor than that resulting from
the commission of a serious crime. An overburdened prosecutor
might therefore tend to ignore or treat lightly contumacious conduct, unless it involved a serious breach of the peace or interfered
with an ongoing criminal investigation. In contrast, the judiciary is
more likely to be sensitive to the seriousness of all contempts because
they constitute affronts to its authority.
This argument is admittedly speculative. It is not clear that prose127. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts includes in its Annual
Report the number of criminal contempt cases disposed of each year. In 1973 there
were only 56 such cases in 90 judicial districts. 1973 Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hereinafter Annual Report],
in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
HELD AT WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 5-6, 1973, AND SEPT. 13-14, 1973, at 409 (1974).
There is no indication of the number of criminal contempt cases filed. Hml'.ever,
since contempt proceedings are relatively summary, there is probably a close correlation between the number of cases initiated and the number disposed of in any
given year.
For a comment on the accuracy of the Administrative Office's statistics, see note
134 infra.
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cutors would be more reluctant than courts to initiate criminal
contempt proceedings. Moreover, as noted previously,128 prosecutorial control over the initiating decision would enhance at least
the appearance of fairness in contempt cases. Nevertheless, uncertainty as to how the prosecutor might react to contempts is perhaps
a sufficient reason for the judiciary not to relinquish completely its
control over the initiating function.
A partial response to this argument is that courts, while they
have expressed the need for authority to exercise the contempt
power independently of legislative action,129 have rarely voiced
concern over the possible abuses of the initiating power by the executive.130 On the contrary, courts have suggested that the method of
initiation is not a critical aspect of the contempt power,181 and
have acquies~ed in executive initiation of criminal contempt
proceedings.132
More importantly, there is evidence that prosecutors would
not ignore contumacious conduct. In a number of recalcitrant
witness criminal contempt cases under rule 42(b), the prosecutor
initially sought the contempt citation,133 and prosecutors interviewed
in conjunction with this study134 invariably stated that they were
128. See text at notes 98-100 supra.
129. See cases cited note 2 supra.
130. But see O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1942), revd.
on other grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir. 1971) (contention that use of indictment violates rule 42(b) without merit); Kienle v. Jewel
Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1955) (court or prosecutor, not private person,
is appropriate party to take action against criminal contcmnors).
132. See cases cited note 28 supra.
133. E.g., United States v. De Simone, 267 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 827 (1959); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1956).
134. The interviews, which focused on the use of the contempt power to deal
with recalcitrant witnesses, were conducted by the author with 18 current or
recently resigned federal prosecutors in six cities: Baltimore, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, New York, and Washington, D.C. The interviews averaged 30 to 40 minutes
each. Most of those interviewed were extremely cooperative, but none was able to
give precise statistical data about the use of the contempt sanction over a long period
of time. Such data does not exist in any readily available form. The annual reports
of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts list the
number of criminal contempt cases disposed of each year, but do not indicate the
number of dvil contempt cases filed or disposed of, or subdivide the criminal contempt cases among the various types of contumacious conduct. See, e.g., Annual
Report, supra note 127, at 409. Furthermore, it is .not clear that these statistics arc
accurate. Although the interviewees confirmed that there were very few contempt
cases of either type, see note 127 supra, both prosecutors and staff members in several clerk of court offices were uncertain as to how contempt cases were filed. Apparently, they are sometimes given separate docket numbers and files and sometimes
merely noted as part of the principal case. The variation in treatment docs not
necessarily relate to whether the contempt is civil or criminal or whether the contempt
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responsible for the initiation of contempt cases against recalcitrant
grand jury witnesses.135 Indeed, most of the prosecutors viewed
themselves, and not the judges, as possessing the power to decide
whether to initiate contempt proceeding"S in these cases.136
Even in criminal contempt cases, including recalcitrant witness
cases, that are initiated by the court upon its own motion137 or at
the request of a private party138 or a government official not associated with a prosecutor's office,139 there is little if any reason to
believe that the effect of removing judicial initiating discretion
would be detrimental.140 A prosecutor is not likely to jeopardize
his working relationship with the judiciary by refusing reasonable
involves a particular type of conduct, and the practices seem to vary not only from
office to office but also within particular offices. There apparently has been no
attempt by either the Justice Department or the courts to make the filing system
uniform.
Despite the absence of empirical data and the limited number of interviews, the
information reported here is probably reliable. Although some prosecutors are more
willing than others to condone a witness' recalcitrance, and although recalcitrant
witness problems arise more frequently in some judicial districts than in others,
the interviews revealed substantial uniformity in approaches to recalcitrant witness
problems in situations in which the recalcitrance is not simply condoned. See note
136 infra and accompanying text. There is no reason to believe that the views and
experiences of the prosecutors interviewed are not representative of current federal
practice.
The interviews were given with the understanding that the interviewees would
remain anonymous. To honor this understanding, the information reported here will
be limited to general conclusions and impressions.
135. No prosecutor could recall more than three or four recalcitrant witness cases
in his judicial district in any year, and most of these involved grand jury ·witnesses.
Although in these cases the prosecutors usually sought coercive civil contempt sanctions, they indicated that their role in initiating the proceedings does not depend
upon whether the contempt is civil or criminal. On the differences benveen civil and
criminal contempts, see notes 149-73 infra and accompanying text.
136. Since a prosecutor is unlikely to seek a court order commanding a grand
jury witness' cooperation unless he is prepared to follow through · with a contempt
proceeding in the event of continued recalcitrance, the decision whether to seek the
court order is usually the critical one. Most of the prosecutors maintained, however,
that even after an order is issued, they retain control over the decision whether to
proceed with a contempt action, and at least as a practical matter, they were probably correct. After the judge issues the order to testify, the witness usually will
return to the grand jury room for further questioning, and, as the prosecutors
pointed out, judges generally do not inquire whether their orders to testify are
obeyed. If a witness still refuses to testify, the judge will probably not become
aware of the contempt unless the prosecutor calls the refusal to his attention. If
the prosecutor seeks a contempt sanction, his request will rarely be refused. Cf. note
147 infra and accompanying text.
137. E.g., In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Pace, 371
F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. E.g., In re Fletcher, 107 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664
(1940).
139. E.g., FTC v. Gladstone, 450 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Rico, 182
F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1950).
140. But see WORKING P.Al'ERS, supra note 2, at 625-26.
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judicial requests for the initiation of contempt proceedings,141 and
the fact that prosecutors do not appear to avoid requests from other
agencies for perjury and obstruction of justice prosecutions142 suggests that they probably would not ignore agencies' requests for
contempt prosecutions.143 Whether prosecutors would be equally
willing to initiate contempt cases at the request of a private citizen
is unclear._ However, even if they would be less responsive to such
requests, it is doubtful that any serious incidents of contumacious
conduct would remain unpunished. If the contempt were serious,
the agency or court before which the conduct occurred or the court
whose order was violated would also probably urge prosecution.
If there is any danger in giving initiating discretion over contempts to the executive, it is that prosecutors may initiate contempt
proceedings that should not be pursued. 144 The contempt sanction
has sometimes been utilized as a device to suppress dissident activity,145 and the Justice Department on at least one occasion
apparently considered this an appropriate use of the power.140 Par141. The limited experience in Colorado, where criminal contempts are routinely
initiated by indictment, lends some support to this proposition. See note 98 supra.
But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 626, suggesting that a prosecutor "might
well [exercise his discretion not to prosecute] • • • where the contumacious conduct
was favorable to his cause" [e.g., where a witness refuses to provide evidence that
will be helpful to a criminal defendant]. If such inaction occurs in situations in
which the court has no knowledge of the contumacious conduct, see, e.g., note 136
supra, maintaining initiating discretion in the judiciary does not make imposition
of an appropriate contempt sanction more likely. If, on the other hand, the court
requests prosecution, it seems unlikely that a prosecutor would be less willing to
honor that request than a request to forgo prosecution. Cf. "\VoRKING PAPERS, supra,
at 625 ("[I]t is not likely that a United States Attorney would prosecute if the court
informally let it be known that a prosecution was unwarranted ••••"). In addition,
if there is not sufficient justification for giving the judiciary initiating discretion
over other cases in which the prosecutor has a potential conflict of interest, cf. note
100 supra &: note 211 infra, there would appear to be no reason to do so in contempt cases.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1971) (perjury
prosecution Jor false testimony in SEC investigation); United States v. Alo, 439 F,2d
751 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971) (obstruction of justice prosecution
for giving false and evasive answers in SEC investigation),
143. In any event, most contempt proceedings to enforce agency processes are civil
rather than criminal. See Bartosic & Lanoff, supra note 11, at 262; Note, Use of
Contempt Power To Enforce Subpoenas and Orders of Administrative Agencies, 'll
HARv. L. REv. 1541, 1555 (1958). Thus, a reallocation of initiating discretion for
criminal contempts from the judiciary to the executive would have little, if any,
impact on agency practices and policies.
144. See "\\ToRKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625.
145. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 7-9. See also Healey v. United States, 186
F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950); Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1950),
Consider also the fears expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 153-54 (dissenting opinion).
146. See Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d 480, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1950) (Denman,
C.J., supplemental opinion),
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ticularly in recalcitrant ·witness cases that arise in the grand jury
context, prosecutors are likely to have a more direct interest than
the court in ensuring that the contumacious conduct is punished,
and a requirement of judicial initiation in these instances could
minimize potential abuses of power. However, since courts traditionally have not exercised such a restraining infl.uence,147 it is
doubtful that transferring the initiating function from the judiciary
to the executive would aggravate these abuses. Furthermore, the
potential for prosecutorial abuse of this nature is not limited to
contempt cases but can arise in any situation in which a prosecutor
has a particularly zealous attitude toward the matter at issue.148 The
fear of unwarranted prosecutions therefore is not a sufficient basis
for treating criminal contempts differently from other criminal
prosecutions.

4. Benefits of Executive Initiating Discretion
The discussion has already suggested one important benefit of
executive initiating discretion: enhancing the fairness or at least the
appearance of fairness in criminal contempt proceedings. A second
substantial benefit would be the elimination of the confusion that
often exists with respect to whether a contempt proceeding is civil
or criminal.
The inherent judicial power to punish for' contempt includes the
power to impose both criminal and civil contempt penalties,149 but
147. There appears to be only one reported case in which a court denied a
federal prosecutor's request for a contempt citation: Ex parte McLeod, 120 F. 130

(N.D. Ala. 1903). Cf. Note, supra note 63, at 184-85.
148. See note 100 supra.
149. Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8e Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-52 (1911).
Except for 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970), which was enacted as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 and which applies only to contemnors who refuse to testify
before grand juries or other judicial bodies, there is no federal statute dealing specifically with civil contempts. This raises the question whether section 401, see text at
notes 17-25 supra, is applicable to civil as well as criminal contempts. The answer is
probably affirmative. In Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947), the Supreme
Court, although explicitly refusing to decide the issue, assumed for the purpose of its
decision that the fine or imprisonment limitation was applicable to civil contempts,
and in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 382 (1919) (dictum), the Court, without
specifying the particular statutory provision, apparently relied on section 401(l)'s
predecessor in suggesting that perjury in the presence of a court does not constitute
civil contempt. Cf. United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998,
1000 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum); Special Comm. of the Junior Barristers of the Los
Angeles Bar Assn., Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D.
167, 169 (1955). See also note 150 infra. But see Griffin v. County School Board, 363
F.2d 206, 210-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966); In re Sixth 8e Wisconsin
Tower, Inc., 108 F.2d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1939) (Evans, J., concurring).
In some situations, the availability of a civil contempt sanction may preclude the
use of a criminal contempt penalty, even though the conduct falls within section 401.
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there are substantial differences between the two types of contempt.
In contrast to the punitive objective of the criminal contempt
sanction, civil contempt remedies are designed to compensate parties
injured by violations of court orders or to coerce compliance with
such orders.150 When the objective is coercion, the sanction may be
either (I) a fine that is payable absent compliance by a certain
date151 or that increases with continued noncompliance,162 or (2) a
jail sentence that will terminate when the contemnor indicates a
willingness to obey the order.163 Since both the compensatory and
coercive contempt sanctions are viewed as equitable civil remedies,164
the contempts need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;161i the
In Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), which involved the refusal of a
witness to testify before a grand jury, the Court stated by way of dictum that "the
trial judge [must] first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should resort to criminal sanctions only after
he determines for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate." 384
U.S. at 371 n.9. To date, however, there are no reported cases in which a court has
relied on the Shillitani dictum to refuse a request to have a defendant held in criminal
contempt. But cf. United States v. Marra, 482 F.2d 1196, 1202 (2d Cir. 1973) (short period
of time remaining for purgation is sufficient indication of the inappropriateness of
the civil sanction).
150. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); United States v. UMW,
330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-43,
448-49 (1911).
Judicial declarations that the purpose of the civil contempt sanctions is to coerce
compliance with or compensate for the violation of court orders are probably merely
descriptive of the fact that most civil contempt cases arise after the violation of a
court order and do not imply a limitation on the availability of civil contempt to
deal with other types of contumacious conduct. See Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d
908 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 898 (1950); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378
(1919). But cf. In re Sixth &: Wisconsin Tower, 108 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1939).
151. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 305 (1947) (fine payable unless con•
tempt purged within five days); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252
F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1958) (in addition to compensatory fine, defendant ordered to
pay fixed fine for each future violation). But cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 370-71 n.6 (1966) (dictum that a fixed term of imprisonment to commence if
the contemnor fails to purge himself within a specified time may not be an appropriate civil contempt sanction).
152. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
153. See, e.g., In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959
(1965).
Since the purpose of the sanction is solely coercive, the penalty cannot extend
beyond the time when compliance becomes impossible, Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); Loubriel v. United
States, 9 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1926), and in the case of witnesses who refuse to testify
before grand juries and other judicial bodies, the maximum period of incarceration
may not exceed 18 months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). Thus, a recalcitrant grand jury
witness who refuses to purge himself of the contempt would be released at the expi•
ration of the grand jury term or after 18 months, whichever occurs first. On the
length of grand jury terms, see 18 U.S.C. § 3331 (1970); FED, R. CRIM, P. 6(g).
154. See cases cited note 150 supra.
155. Civil contempt must be proved by something more than a preponderance of
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contemnor does not have the right to a jury trial;166 and whereas
the rules of appellate review for criminal judgments are applicable
to criminal contempts,167 civil contempt judgments are appealable
in accordance with the rules applicable to civil judgments.168
Despite these differences, both civil and criminal contempts
usually are initiated by an oral or written judicial order to show
cause.um For this reason, and because the violation of a court order
may appear to warrant either a criminal or a civil sanction, or
both,160 it is often unclear whether the proceeding is for criminal or
civil contempt.161
Prior to the adoption of rule 42, courts tended to classify contempts as civil or criminal according to such factors as the title of
the evidence but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Oriel v.
Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1928); Schauffier v. Local 1291, ILA, 292 F.2d 182, 189-90
(3d Cir. 1961); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir.
1943). See also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 251-53.
156. See R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 175; Dobbs, supra note 8, at 231-34.
157. Annot., 24 AL.R.3d 650, 663-74 (1969).
158. See generally Annot., 33 AL.R.3d 448 (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970)
(appeal from civil contempt judgment for refusal to testify before grand jury or other
judicial body must be disposed of within at least 30 days of the filing of the appeal).
159. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.
1958).
Occasionally coercive civil contempt sanctions are imposed without prior notice and
hearing, and the federal prosecutors interviewed for this study, see note 134 supra, indicated that this practice was common in recalcitrant witness cases. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 1971) affd. sub nom. Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); In re October 1969 Grand Jury, 435 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir.
1970). 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970) provides that coercive civil contempt penalties may
be."summarily'' imposed against recalcitrant witnesses; it is unclear, however, whether
this provision is intended to authorize the imposition of a civil contempt penalty
without notice and hearing. The legislative history suggests that the statute was
"designed to codify present practice." See 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007,
4022. At least two cases have held that a grand jury witness charged with civil contempt is entitled to the same notice and opportunity to prepare a defense that is
provided criminal contemnors by rule 42(b). In re Sadin, Docket No. 74-2003 (2d Cir.
Jan. 23, 1975); United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. United
States v. Boe, 491 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1974). But see In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1162
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1974); In re October 1969 Grand
Jury, 435 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1970).
.
160. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1955); United States v. UMW, 330
U.S. 258, 298-99 (1947). If the procedural requirements for 'criminal contempts are
complied with, both a civil and a criminal contempt penalty may be imposed in the
same proceeding. 330 U.S. at 299. Section 401's limitation on the penalty to fine or
imprisonment will not preclude a ti.De for one offense and imprisonment for the other.
See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947). Cf. MacNiel v. United States, 236
F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
161. See, e.g., Clark v. Boynton, 362 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1966) (remand to determine
if contempt criminal or civil). Cf. United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp. 633,
636-37 (D. Mont. 1957). On the general difficulty of distinguishing between criminal
and civil contempts, see Gompers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441•52
(1911); R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2; at 49-67.
'
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the proceeding,162 whether the defendant testified,163 the nature of
the relief sought164 or granted,165 and who conducted the prosecution.166 The controlling factor would vary from case to case, and
the labeling might occur for the first time on appeal, when classification of the contempt as civil or criminal was necessary to decide a
procedural issue.167 In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,168
Judge Learned Hand pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of the
tests for distinguishing the two types of contempt and suggested
that there should and can be "some simple and certain tests by
which the character of the prosecution can be determined." 100 The
promulgation of rule 42(b), which provides that the notice to the
defendant "shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal
contempt charged and describe it as such,"170 was in part a response
to Judge Hand's criticism.171 It has proved, however, to be an ineffective response. Courts have held that the failure to label the
charge as criminal does not preclude the imposition of a criminal
penalty,172 and even if the proceeding is clearly designated as criminal, an appellate court may nonetheless conclude that the contempt
was civil.178
so· long as distinct civil and criminal contempt sanctions remain
available to deal with the same conduct, the best way to avoid the
confusion ben'leen the two remedies is to distinguish more clearly
the initiating processes for each. Giving the executive initiating
discretion over criminal contempts would accomplish this task.
Since the prosecutor would initiate all criminal contempts pursuant
to an indictment or information, there would be no need for rule
42(b) initiation, and the existence of an indictment or information
would clearly indicate that the contempt was criminal.174 The de162. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Housel, 288 F. 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1923).
163. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dexter, 244 F. 926, 929-30 (1st Cir. 1917).
164. See, e.g., Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 220 (1932).
165. See, e.g., In re Merchants' Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912).
166. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (2d Cir. 1913), See In re Eskay, 122 F,2d 819,
822-23 (3d Cir. 1941); R. GoLDFARB, supra note 2, at 62-64.
167. See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-44 (1941); In re Merchants'
Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639 (1912); In re Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935).
Cf. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
168. 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 603 (1936).
169. 80 F.2d at 214.
170. (Emphasis added.) See note 27 supra.
171. See Notes of Advisory Committee, 18 U.S.C.A. FED. R. CRu1r. P. 42 (1961).
172. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 297-98 (1947); FI'C v. Gladstone, 450
F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971).
173. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966),
174. Since there is no precedent for adjudicating civil claims in ordinary criminal
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fenclant would know in advance that a finding of contempt would
result in a criminal penalty, and the rules of trial and appellate
procedure would be clear from the outset. Since criminal penalties
could not 'be imposed in the absence of an indictment or information, there would be no opportunity for a judge to frustrate an
aggrieved party's coercive objective by treating the application for
a conditional sanction as a criminal contempt.175
Executive control over initiation may also lead to a more systematic treatment of criminal contempts: Since a court could not
require a prosecutor to litigate a contempt action,17 6 the prosecutor
could evaluate the importance of particular cases in light of other
demands on his time. If one assumes that prosecutors will react as
responsibly to contempt allegations as to allegations of other types
of criminal conduct, this would result in a better and more efficient
allocation of prosecutorial resources. In addition, recognition that
the executive is responsible for the initiation of all criminal contempts may cause prosecutors to develop a more systematic approach
to initiating decisions; which they may currently treat in a relatively
ad hoc fashion merely because contempts are perceived as sui generis
offenses.
Since prosecutors already exercise de facto initiating discretion
in many contempt cases,177 formal transfer of initiating discretion to
the executive may not have a substantial impact on current practices. Moreover, since contempt cases arise infrequently in most
judicial districts,178 it may be difficult to avoid an ad hoc approach
to initiating decisions regardless of who has formal initiating power.
Nevertheless, granting initiating discretion to the executive would
provide at least the potential for a more systematic treatment of
contempts.
cases, the decision to treat criminal contempts as other crimes for the purpose of
initiation presumably would preclude the imposition of both civil and criminal contempt sanctions in the same proceeding. Although the Supreme Court approved the
practice of imposing both types of sanctions in a single proceeding in United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947), it also suggested that the better practice is to try the
contempts separately. 330 U.S. at 299. Cf. United States v. Consolidated Prods., Inc.,
326 F. Supp. 603, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
175. In Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 588 (1947), the district court had refused
to grant the coercive relief requested by the SEC and instead imposed a "flat unconditional fine of $50.00 ••••"
176. Courts commonly appoint United States attorneys to prosecute criminal contempt cases. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 384 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1967), affd.,
395 U.S. 147 (1969). For a strong criticism of the appointment of counsel for an opposing party to prosecute a criminal contempt action, see Brotherhood of Locomotive
J;ircmen &: Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 318-20 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Kienle
v. Jewel Tea Co., 222 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 344 U.S. 918 (1955).
177. See text at notes 133-36 supra.
178. See note 127 supra.
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Finally, transferring initiating discretion to the executive could
assist in removing an ambiguity as to the applicability of the double
jeopardy clause179 to criminal contempts. To date, the Supreme
Court has not fully extended the prohibition against double jeopardy
to criminal contempts, and several early contempt cases, relying on
the sui generis characterization of contempts, state that the same
act may be punished both as a criminal contempt and as an ordinary crime.180 While the continued validity of these cases is questionable in light of the Court's recent expansion of the constitutional
rights due to criminal contemnors181 and its expansion of the scope of
the double jeopardy clause in noncontempt contexts,182 the cases have
not been specifically repudiated.183 Were the Court to require executive initiation by holding that criminal contempts are indistinguishable from other criminal prosecutions, presumably the double
jeopardy clause would be fully applicable.184

5. Methods of Limiting Judicial Control over the
Initiating Function
a. Judicial action. No legislation is necessary to transfer the
initiating function for criminal contempts from the judiciary to
the executive. The judiciary could accomplish this result by several
methods, each of which has ample precedential support. First, it
could explicitly recognize that judicial initiation of criminal contempts is the only significant difference between contempts and
other crimes and that there is no necessity for the unique rule 42(b)
initiating procedures. On this basis, the Supreme Court could hold
that all criminal contempts not summarily punishable pursuant to
rule 42(a) are "crimes" within the meaning of the fifth amendment
179. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
180. See O'Malley v. United States; 128 F.2d 676, 684 (8th Cir. 1942), reod. on other
grounds sub nom. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); Merchants' Stock
&: Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F. 20, 27 (8th Cir. 1912). Cf. Jurney v. MacCracken,
294 U.S. 125, 151-52 (1935); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897); Chicago
Directory Co. v. United States Directory Co., 123 F. 194 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903): United
States v. Mirra, 220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). But see In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 52
(1943), discussed in Dobbs, supra note 8, at 242.
181. See text at notes 35-51 supra.
182. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (rejection of dual sovereignty theory
as a basis for allowing both a state and a municipality within the state to impose
criminal penalties for the same act); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969)
(protection against double jeopardy is fundamental right within the meaning of due
process of law). See also Colombo v. New York, 405 U.S. 9 (1972).
183, But see United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
184. Even if the nonconstitutional methods suggested in the next section, see text
at notes 193-213 infra, were utilized to require or encourage executive initiation of
criminal contempts, the resulting assimilation of aiminal contempts with other crimes
would tend to undermine the proposition that criminal contempts are sui generis and
therefore not within the scope of the protection against double jeopardy.
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grand jury provision as well as all of the other constitutional and
nonconstitutional provisions generally applicable to crimes and
criminal prosecutions.185 There are, however, three potential problems with this approach:
First, the application of the grand jury provision to criminal
contempts could affect the courts' sentencing discretion in criminal
contempt cases. This matter will be considered below.186
Second, relinquishing the claim to inherent contempt power
may entail unwarranted risks. Subsequently enacted legislation that
unduly restricts the contempt sanction, or executive insensitivity to
the effect of contumacious conduct, could force the Court to reevaluate its position and to attempt to justify a reversal of or exception to its earlier decision.187 Furthermore, the argument against
judicial exercise of the initiating function may not be as compelling
for all types of contempt cases as it is for recalcitrant witness cases,
where the prosecutor often exercises de facto initiating discretion.
These risks, however, are probably minimal. There is little reason
to believe that prosecutors would irresponsibly exercise their discretion in nonwitness contempt cases,188 and the problem of restrictive
legislative action can be anticipated by clearly basing the holding
on the adequacy of existing legislation.
Finally, there is the problem of overruling the substantial precedent approving rule 42 and basing contemnors' constitutional protections on notions of due process rather than on the more specific
185. This alternative is based on the assumption that prosecutors would be able
to initiate proceedings for violations of section 401 by indictment or information. The
possibility that section 401 may be interpreted to preclude independent executive
initiation of contempts is considered at note 206 infra and accompanying text.
186. See text at notes 216-56 infra.
187. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT.
R.Ev. 211.
188. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. Perhaps the greatest risk is
that attorneys may not be punished for their misconduct. Prosecutors may be reluctant to initiate contempt proceedings against other members of the bar and especially
against colleagues in their own offices. Trial courts, however, have sometimes abused
their discretion in exercising contempt power against defense attorneys, see, e.g.,
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), and courts generally do not utilize the contempt power against prosecutors.
See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEXAS L.
R.Ev. 629, 674 (1972); Singer, Forensic Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors-And How
It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REv. 227, 276 (1968). Nevertheless, it is arguable that judicial
abuses of the contempt power could be substantially minimized by the elimination
of rule 42(a) initiating procedures and that prosecutors should be no more immune
from the contempt sanction than other attorneys. Cf. N. DoRSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 9, at 186-87, 226-38. If one accepts these propositions, there may be a limited
role for the exercise of inherent judicial contempt power. Although the possibility
of unwarranted refusals to prosecute does not exist only in the case of misconduct by
attorneys, see notes 100 supra &: 211 infra, that possibility coupled with the recognition that an attorney, as an officer of the court, has a special obligation to preserve
and maintain respect for the judiciary, see N. DoRSEN &: L. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 144,
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prov1S1ons of the Bill of Rights.180 The complete assimilation of
criminal contempts with other crimes could be viewed merely as
the final step in a consistent progression of judicial decisions that
have gradually eroded the distinctions between contempts and other
crimes.180 However, one might take the position that the long tradition of evaluating contempt procedures by standards of due process
should not be rejected in the absence of some compelling necessity,181
and that the benefits of placing initiating discretion with the executive, although substantial, are not sufficient to justify the overruling
of extensive prior authority.102
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to abandon the due process
precedent in criminal contempt cases, it could still effect a substantial assimilation of criminal contempts with other crimes by at
least one and possibly two methods. First, the Court could submit
to Congress an amendment to rule 42 that would eliminate paragraph (b) and require that all criminal contempts not punishable
pursuant to rule 42(a) be initiated in the same manner as other
criminal prosecutions. Unless Congress rejected the amendment
within ninety days, it would become law.103
Second, just as it did in initially applying the jury trial right to
criminal contempts,1°4 the Court perhaps could rely on its supervisory power over federal courts185 to hold that criminal contempts
not punishable pursuant to rule 42(a) must be initiated by indictment or information. It is unclear, however, whether the imposition
of such a requirement is within the scope of the Court's supervisory
power.196 The limits of that power are not clearly de:fined,187 and
is arguably a sufficient basis to justify the use of inherent contempt power in cases of
attorney misconduct.
189. See text at notes 43-45 supra.
190. Compare the gradual (but not yet complete) assimilation of criminal con,
tempts with other crimes, see text at notes 35-51 supra, with the !'requirements of
later precedent" rationale for overruling earlier precedent discussed in Israel, supra
note 187, at 223-26, 242-61. But cf. text at notes 216-19 infra.
191. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192-93 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Cf. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650-52 (1895)
(White, J., dissenting).
192. Whether the benefits of executive initiation and the lack of necessity £or utilizing rule 42(b) procedures provide sufficient bases for overruling the due process
precedents depends primarily on one's views as to the role of precedent in judicial
decision-making. See generally Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Constitutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. 589 (1931); Israel, supra note 187, at 215-19, Compare
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion with Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 189-219 (1958).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970). See l C. WRIGHT 8: A. MILLER, supra note 114, § 4.
194. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966).
195. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
196. There is no explicit constitutional grant of supervisory power to the Supreme
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the precedent for joint judicial and legislative action to adopt and
amend the Federal Rules provides a basis for argq.ing that the
Court cannot take unilateral action that, in effect, would constitute
an amendment to rule 42.198 Even if the Court believed that it had
such power, it might be reluctant to pursue a course of action that
bypasses the established procedures for congressional approval of
amendments to the Rules.1 99
Prior to any action by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts,
without overruling past precedent or becoming completely dependent upon the executive's initiating decisions, could effect a significant restriction on the judicial power to decide whether to initiate
criminal contempts. As early as 1821 the Supreme Court recognized
that the rationale for the exercise of the contempt power was necessity and, therefore, that its use should be limited to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."200 Although courts have
not always been consistent in observing this dictum,201 the Supreme
Court has referred to it in judicial contempt cases to stress the imCourt. To the extent that the Court has supervisory power not explicitly granted to
it by Congress, the power exists as an inherent judicial power. See Note, supra note
71, at 1051•52. Whether such power extends to changing the method for initiating
criminal contempts is the question whether change should be viewed as an exercise
of judicial power or as an exercise of legislative power. See id. at 1051-56. Cf. Levin
&: Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958). See also Hyde, From Common Law
Rules to Rules of Court, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 187 (1937).
197. See Note, supra note 71.

198. It is arguable, however, that the power to make and amend procedural rules
is, at least to some extent, an inherent judicial power. See Pound, supra note 71, at·
601; Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 Ju,. L. REv. 276 (1928). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT 8c A. Mru.ER, supra
note 114, § 1001.
199. A third possibility is a holding by the Supreme Court that the potential for
bias or the appearance of unfairness that results from the vesting of initiating discretion over contempts with the judiciary, see text at notes 97-100 supra, violates the
contemnor's right to due process. The Court's recent concern with the appearance
of unfairness that results when a judge before whom a contempt is committed sits
in judgment over the contemnor, see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1974),
reemphasizes that due process requires maintaining the appearance of fairness. However, there may be a substantial difference, at least for the purposes of due process,
between the appearance of unfairness that results from allowing a judge with prior
knowledge of contumacious conduct to try, convict, and sentence the contemnor, and
the appearance of unfairness that results merely from the fact that the judiciary may
exercise initiating discretion in contempt cases. Furthermore, it is by no means clear
that even a judge's prior knowledge of the contempt necessarily would require his
disqualification. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501-02.
200. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821). Although Dunn dealt
with the congressional contempt power, the Supreme Court has stated that the "least
possible power" principle also should govern the exercise of judicial contempt power.
In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).
201. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), overruled in Harris v.
_United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
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portance of ensuring that a contemnor not be denied important
procedural rights. 202 It would be consistent with the spirit of these
precedents for lower courts, on a case-by-case basis, to refuse to initiate contempt proceedings203 on the theory that ordinary criminal
prosecution would be an adequate alternative. Should the prosecutor thereafter refuse to initiate proceedings, the court could still
do so. From this process there could evolve a line of precedent applicable to broad categories of contumacious conduct.
A similar but more far-reaching approach would be for the presiding judges in the various judicial districts to establish an informal
policy of utilizing the indictment process rather than rule 42(b) for
the initiation of all or certain types of criminal contempts. Such a
policy has been successfully established through the cooperative
efforts of the presiding judge and the United States Attorney's office
in at least one judicial district,204 and the adoption of similar policies
in other districts would be desirable.
b. Legislative action. Congress may be able to provide alternative or additional limitations on the courts' exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in criminal contempt cases. Initially, Congress should
explicitly provide that violations of section 40 I may be treated as
ordinary criminal prosecutions. Since section 401 is the only criminal statute that provides that "a court shall have the power to
punish" the conduct described therein, and since the only significant difference between criminal contempts and ordinary criminal
prosecutions is the different initiating process for each, it is possible
to interpret that section as a statement only of the courts' power to
initiate and punish criminal contempts, and not as an ordinary
criminal statute.205 Viewed in this light, the cases allowing the
initiation of criminal contempts by indictment are not authority
for the proposition that violations of section 401 may be treated as
ordinary criminal prosecutions; rather, they merely represent judicial approval of the prosecutor's decision to initiate proceedings.200
A more far-reaching step would be for Congress to repeal or
limit the scope of section 40 I and, at the same time, enact specific
202. E.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165 (1965) (rule 42(a) procedures
are not available to punish grand jury witness who refuses to testify); In re Michael,
326 U.S. 224-, 227 (194-5) (mere perjury is not criminal contempt; to allow prosecution
of perjury would deprive defendant of important procedural safeguards). Cf. United
States v. Seale, 4-61 F,2d 34-5, 353 (7th Cir. 1972),
203. Cf. cases cited note 62 supra.
204-. See note 98 supra.
205. See note 84- supra.
206. It is by no means clear that this interpretation of section 401 and the indictment precedents is correct. The only practical difference betiveen viewing section 401
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criminal statutes (where they do not already exist207) to cover the
types of conduct currently included therein.208 While complete
repeal of section 401 may be unacceptable to the Supreme Court,209
it is reasonable to expect that the Court would uphold legislation
that eliminates judicial initiating discretion in types of cases in
which the need for such discretion is most clearly lacking210-for
example, in recalcitrant ·witness cases not subject to rule 42(a).
If Congress fears that prosecutors will be reluctant to initiate
proceedings for some types of contumacious conduct excluded from
the amended section 401, it could provide that in such cases the
prosecutor, at the request of a court, must formally initiate proceedings or at least present the case to the grand jury.211 The
contempt of Congress statute212 provides precedent for such a requirement. The constitutionality of this legislative restriction on
prosecutorial discretion apparently has not been challenged, however, and it is unclear to what extent, if at all, Congress may impose
such restrictions on the executive's initiating discretion.218
as merely a statement of the courts' contempt power and viewing it as a statute that
will support independent executive (as well as judicial) initiation of contempts is
that the former reading of section 401 would permit courts to exercise discretionary
power to dismiss contempt indictments. See text at notes 62-63 supra. There is no
indication, however, that either the judiciary or Congress has vi~ved this discretionary
power to forgo prosecution as an essential aspect of the courts' contempt power. See
cases cited note 131 supra. But cf. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625.
207. Such statutes do exist for some types of contumacious conduct. See, e.g., note
82 supra.
208. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
209. See text at note 79 supra. See also Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42,
65-66 (1924).
210. See text at notes 78-88 supra.
211, If there is a reasonable fear that prosecutors may initiate unwarranted proceedings, the legislation might also require prior judicial approval of the initiating
decision for types of cases in which abuse is most likely. See PROP, FED. CruM. CoDE,
supra note 83, § 1349; WoruuNG PAPERS, supra note 2, at 625-26. However, in view of
the fact that the judiciary generally has not exercised its discretion to refuse prosecutors' requests for the initiation of section 401 contempt proceedings, cf. note 147
supra, the value of such a provision is doubtful.
Because it would defeat the objective of transferring initiating discretion to the
executive for Congress to limit the scope of section 401 and at the same time apply
substantial restrictions on prosecutorial discretion, it should apply such restrictions
only where there is a likelihood of abuse of discretion, and it should not necessarily
limit the restrictions to crimes previously punishable under section 401. For example,
a reasonable fear that prosecutors may not initiate proceedings against witnesses
whose misconduct is helpful in attaining a conviction, see note 141 supra, may justify
requiring prosecution upon judicial certification in such situations.
212. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1970) provides that the Speaker of the House or the President
of the Senate shall certify facts constituting a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970) (contempt of Congress) to the appropriate United States Attorney, "whose duty it shall
be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action." See WORKING PAPERS,
supra note 2, at 625 (congressional certification not only imposes a duty to prosecute,
but it may be a prerequisite to prosecution).
213. Perhaps there would be no objection to legislation that merely required the
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, c. Executive action. Even in the absence of legislative and judicial efforts to limit the use of rule 42, the executive can play a role
in demonstrating the lack of necessity for unique initiating procedures in criminal contempt cases. Since section 401 contempts may
be initiated as ordinary criminal prosecutions,214 prosecutors seeking-contempt penalties could simply proceed by way of information
or indictment. Although there may appear to be little incentive
for a prosecutor to forgo use of rule 42(b), a prosecutorial policy of
initiating criminal contempts by information or indictment would
at least have the benefit of reducing possible confusion over whether
a contempt is civil or criminal.215
C. Independence of the Judiciary from the Executive
and Grand Jury: Sentencing
The Supreme Court's holding that the fifth amendment right to
a grand jury indictment is inapplicable to criminal contempts216 is
prosecutor to present the case to the grand jury. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 182-85 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Outside
the contempt area, however, courts have taken the position that deciding whether
formally to initiate criminal proceedings is a discretionary executive function, and
that the separation of powers doctrine precludes the judiciary from requiring prosecution in particular cases. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
Although deciding whether to initiate criminal contempt proceedings has been
treated as a judicial function, it is not clear that this function can be exercised in
cases involving conduct that, while traditionally within the scope of the courts' con•
tempt power, is in fact defined as an ordinary criminal offense. On the one hand, it
may appear to laud form over substance to hold that Congress can grant initiating
power to the judiciary by defining conduct as falling within the scope of the courts'
contempt power, but that Congress cannot define the same conduct as an ordinary
offense (outside the scope of the contempt power) and, at the same time, specifically
grant the judiciary some control over the initiating decision. On the other hand,
assuming that Congress' decision to treat the conduct as an ordinary criminal offense tloes not represent an unconstitutional restriction on the courts' inherent contempt power, see text at notes 78-88 supra, the decision to define the conduct as an
ordinary crime arguably should be determinative of the extent to which the executive
is able to exercise independent initiating discretion; the fact that the conduct could
have been defined as within the courts' contempt power should perhaps be irrelevant.
This latter approach would require both Congress and the courts to deal explicitly
and separately with the questions of (1) the appropriate scope of the judicial contempt
power and (2) the extent to which executive prosecutorial discretion over the initiat•
ing decision in ordinary criminal cases may be limited. Specific focus on these questions would avoid any gradual erosion of executive prosecutorial discretion through
a process of legislation and judicial interpretation based solely or primarily on hypo•
thetical assumptions about what Congress might have been able to do. Cf, United
States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472
(1943) (statutory presumption unconstitutional because no rational connection between
fact proved and fact presumed; assertion that Congress had power to proscribe same
conduct without reference to presumed fact, even if correct, does not vitiate unconstitutionality of statute).
214. See cases cited note 28 supra.
215. See note 175 and text at notes 174-75 supra.
216. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
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not surprising in light of the development of the law of contempt.
The Court traditionally has begun with the assumption that contempts are sui generis, and that the summary nature of the procedure is limited only by the requirement of fundamental fairness
implicit in the concept of due process.217 The constitutional right
to a jury trial was extended to criminal contempts only after the
Court had concluded that the right was fundamental and applicable
to state criminal prosecutions through the fourteenth amendment
due process clause,218 and the Court has never taken that position
with respect to the grand jury indictment provision.219 Nevertheless, as suggested previously,220 the issue should not be whether the
right to an indictment is fundamental, but whether the rationale
of necessity, which is the basis for the sui generis classification,
justifies excluding criminal contempts from the scope of the explicit
indictment right. This question is considered here independently
from the question whether initiating discretion should be transferred to the executive.221
Since the right to an indictment in criminal contempt cases
presumably would exist only if the actual penalty exceeded one
year's imprisonment,222 the question becomes one of determining
whether there is any necessity for refusing to limit contempt sentences to one year unless the proceedings are initiated by indictment. There are arguably three such reasons: First, the grand jury
requirement would have a substantial negative impact on the power
of the judiciary to initiate serious criminal contempt charges;
second, regardless of whether the judiciary or the executive should
have initiating discretion, the grand jury, by refusing to return an
indictment, could restrict the courts' power to punish serious con217. See text at notes 35-51 supra.
218. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Compare Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165 (1958) (no constitutional right to jury trial in criminal contempt cases),
decided prior to Duncan, with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (due process
requires jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases). Cf. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384
U.S. 373 (1966).
219. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
220. See text at notes 54-56 supra.
221. In the absence of a decision to treat criminal contempts as ordinary criminal
prosecutions for all purposes, it is probably unlikely that the Supreme Court would
extend the grand jury right to contemnors. The grand jury question, however, is
distinguishable from the question whether initiating discretion should be transferred
to the executive. The Court conld make the indictment right applicable to criminal
contempts on the theory that the grand jury would provide a desirable check on
judicial initiating discretion. Alternatively, the Court conld continue to hold that
contemnors are never entitled to a grand jury indictment and, at the same time,
require executive initiation of contempts. See notes 193-98 supra and accompanying
text.
222. See text at notes 65-69 supra.
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tempts;_ and finally, even if one assumes that the prosecutor should
have the power to initiate all contempt proceedings, he arguably
should not have the power to limit the courts' sentencing discretion.
Yet, if the indictment right were applicable to criminal contempts,
the· prosecutor could limit the potential maximum sentence to one
year simply by proceeding by information rather than indictment.2211
The folio-wing analysis will explore each of these limitations on the
judiciary and suggest that they would probably be desirable. Since
there may be disagreement about some of the ramifications of applying the grand jury right to criminal contempts, however, the section
will conclude with a brief assessment of alternative approaches to
the grand jury issue.
I. The Effect of Granting Contemnors the Right
to a Grand Jury Indictment

The indictment requirement would severely inhibit, if not eliminate, the power of the judiciary to initiate serious criminal contempt charges. If a prosecutor were reluctant to present evidence
of a contempt to the grand jury, the judge could encourage the
grand jury to develop the evidence without the prosecutor's assistance.224 It is questionable, however, whether the indictment would
be valid without the prosecutor's signature. The Federal Rules
require his signature,225 and at least one case226 has held that a
United States Attorney has the discretionary power to refuse to sign
an indictment.
Perhaps a court could avoid these difficulties by relying on its
inherent power to appoint a special prosecutor or by eliminating
the signature requirement in contempt cases.227 However, there are
serious disadvantages in any procedure that allows a judge to bypass
a reluctant prosecutor. Unless indictments were sought in all judi223. See text at notes 69-70 supra.
224. See O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
926 (1966). Cf. Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39
N.Y.S. B.J. 397, 399 (1967).
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(l).
226. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965),
227. In cases involving violations of statutes other than section 401, the appoint•
ment by the court of a special prosecutor would probably be viewed as a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, I'll
(opinion of the court), 190-93 (Wisdom, J., concurring) (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 935 (1965); Note, The Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 577, 614-15 (1973). However, if one starts with the premise that
the only limitation on the judiciary's initiating discretion in criminal contempt cases
is the requirement that a grand jury make a finding of probable cause in serious
cases, the judiciary's inherent power to exercise initiating discretion arguably includes
the power to appoint a special prosecutor to present the case to the grand jury and
to sign the indictment.
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cially initiated contempt cases, an _alternative that seems unduly
burdensome, the judge's decision to seek an indictment would
require him to evaluate and to some extent. pre-judge the case prior
to trial. Even if a different judge conducted the contempt hearing,
he could be prejudiced by the assessment of seriousness made by the
initial judge, and this could affect the severity of the subsequent
sanction.228 While this problem also exists with regard to the jury
trial right, which similarly must be based on a prior assessment of
the seriousness of the offense,229 perhaps the importance of that
right outweighs any danger of prejudice. In contrast, the right to an
indictment arguably is not sufficiently important to risk the possibility of pre-judgment bias.
The difficulty with this argument is the initial premise that the
judiciary needs the discretionary power to initiate contempt proceedings that may result in lengthy sentences. A prosecutor's unwillingness to seek or sign an indictment may indicate that a serious
sanction is unwarranted. The analysis has already suggested that
there is little, if any, need for judicial initiating discretion. How~
ever, even if one assumes that the judiciary should retain some
initiating power, it would be desirable to limit the potential penalty
in judicially initiated contempt cases. The absence of any nonjudicial check on the judiciary's power to initiate and punish affronts to
its authority creates the potential for bias, and an explicit sentencing limitation at least would make the exercise of the power
appear less arbitrary. Although the Supreme Court has indicated
that appellate courts can and should exercise discretion to reduce
excessive contempt penalties,230 the criteria for the exercise of that
discretion are extremely vague,231 and appellate courts have approved a wide range of sentences for what appears to be very similar
conduct.232 In view of the Court's holding that contempts ar~ not_
inherently nonpetty,233 a one-year limitation on the power to sentence contemnors in cases in which the prosecutor -refuses ·to seek
an indictment does not seem unreasonable.
A second possible objection to making the grand jury right
228. It also could affect the fact-finding process in nonjury trials. However, the
contemnor's sentence cannot exceed six months' imprisonment uuless he is given the
right to a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
229. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 382 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
UNIFORM R. Cmr. P. 32l(b), Comments 51-56 (Prop. Final Draft, 1974).
230. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-05 (1947).
231. Cf. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188-89 (1956).
232. See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 58 n.11 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
233. See Bloom v, Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373 (1966).
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applicable to contempts is the fear that the grand jury would refuse
to return an indictment in a case in which either the prosecutor or
judge, or both, felt that .an individual's conduct deserved a serious
penalty. Initially, it is questionable whether such a fear is warranted.
In many contempt cases, there is little doubt as to the existence of
probable cause,234 and, in any event, it is doubtful that a grand jury
would not accede to a request for an indictment.28G If the grand
jury were to refuse to indict, its action might simply reflect a proper
exercise of the institution's time-honored function as a shield against
unwarranted prosecution.236 Still, the grand jury may act arbitrarily.
Given the likely absence of serious probable cause issues, that risk,
even if minimal, is arguably a sufficient basis for denying the nonfundamental indictment right to contemnors.
It should be a sufficient response to this argument to note that a
grand jury's refusal to indict would not preclude prosecution but
would limit only the potential penalty. In light of the extremely
speculative nature of the fear that a grand jury may refuse to indict,
this is a small price to pay for enhancing the potential fairness, or
at least the appearance of fairness, of contempt proceedings.
Finally, even if one assumes that the executive should have the
power to decide whether to initiate contempt proceedings, it arguably should not be able to limit the courts' sentencing discretion
to the imposition of a one-year prison term by utilizing an information rather than an indictment.237 Prosecutors, however, routinely
exercise a closely analogous power in noncontempt cases. When234. This would probably be true, for example, where the contumacious conduct
is a refusal to testify.
235. See Antell, The Modem Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovemment, 51 A.B.A.J.
153 (1965); Note, The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems, 9 CoLUllf, J. L,
&: Soc. PROB. 681, 699-702 (1973). See also Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System,
10 ORE. L. REv. 295, 325, 330, 363 (1931). But cf. Dession, From Indictment to Infor•
mation-Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163, 176-79 (1932),
236. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
237. In noncontempt contexts, only the legislature may limit the courts' sentencing
discretion, and one of the underlying policies _of the double jeopardy ban is the
prevention of executive interference with legislative and judicial sentencing power,
See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 302-08 (1965). If Congress, for example,
sets a maximum penalty at ten years' imprisonment, the prosecutor cannot subvert
that determination by seeking punishment both for the crime and for a lesser included offense. Cf. Kirchheimer1 The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
L.J. 513, 529-31 (1949), If the court decides that the appropriate penalty is less than
the maximum, the double jeopardy provision bars the prosecutor from retrying the
case to obtain a more severe penalty. Cf. In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). However,
as these examples point out, the double jeopardy limitations on executive interference
with sentencing are designed to protect defendants against executive efforts to inctease criminal penalties. Since the sentencing limitation that would result from the
use of an information could work only to the defendant's advantage, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to charge by information rather than by indictment is not
inconsistent with the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause.
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ever they decide which of a number of possible crimes to charge,
and particularly when they engage in plea bargaining prior to the
filing of an indictment or information, they are making discretionary decisions that will limit the court's sentencing power.238
Exercise of this discretionary power in the contempt situation
would be merely a recognition that there are two types of criminal
contempts-infamous and noninfam.ous; 239 it would be as if there
were two contempt statutes, one with no maximum penalty and
one with a maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment.240 Since
the elements of both types of contempts are the same, the absence
of any criteria for distinguishing serious from nonserious contempts
creates the possibility for arbitrary prosecutorial classification.241
238. For example, the recent guilty plea by former Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst to a charge of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192, the contempt of Congress statute,
was based on testimony that was arguably perjurous. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1974,
at I, col. l (late city ed.). The maximum potential penalty for violating the contempt
of Congress statute is one year's imprisonment and a SI,000 fine. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970).
Had Mr. Kleindienst been prosecuted for perjury and found guilty, the maximum
potential penalty would have been five years' imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. 18
u.s.c. § 1621 (1970).
239. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
240. In United States v. Green, 856 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1958), the C'ourt explicitly
held that section 401 gives complete discretion over the length of contempt sentences to the judiciary. Of course, Congress could not give the courts power prohibited by the Constitution, and as an abstract proposition, the Supreme Court
should have no difficulty in holding that Congress has no power to enact a statute
that both allows courts to impose more than a one-year sentence for an ordinary
crime and, at the same time, deprives defendants charged with that crime of the
right to a grand jury indictment. It is.arguably inappropriate, however, for courts to
require grand jury indictments in serious contempt cases when the right to an indictment is not fundamental to fairness and the granting of the right would appear to
contravene Congress' specific delegation of complete sentencing discretion to the
judiciary.
,
There are at least two responses to this congressional intent argument. First, it is
not clear that Congress intended to vest uulimited sentencing discretion in the courts.
Rather, as Green suggests, see 356 U.S. at 169, 179-81, it is likely that Congress was
merely expressing a refusal to regulate the courts' inherent sentencing power, whatever its scope may be. In fact, since the Supreme Court has suggested that the congressional power to regulate contempts is a limited one, see note 86 supra, Congress
may have believed that, even if it wanted to, it could not completely regulate the
sentencing of contempts. If the sentencing provision in section 401 is merely a recognition of the existence of inherent judicial sentencing power rather than a specific
delegation of that power, the statutory language offers no basis for objecting to the
prosecutorial sentencing discretion that would follow from the application of the fifth
amendment grand jury indictment provision to criminal contempts. Second, even if
prosecutorial sentencing discretion would contravene congressional intent, the Supreme
Court has never suggested that the necessity rationale, which justifies the sui generis
treatment of contempts, extends to the protection of legislative as opposed to judicial
interests. Thus, congressional intent should not be a valid justification for a judicial
claim of inherent power to exercise total sentencing discretion.
241. Several state courts have taken the position that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to charge under the more severe of two or more criminal statutes proscribing the same conduct violates the defendant's right to equal protection. See, e.g.,
State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) (defendant entitled to be sentenced under less severe statute); State v. Collins, 55 Wash. 2d 469, 348 P.2d 214
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This problem, however, can be niet only by creating specific maximum penalties for different types of contumacious conduct. Until
that is done, prosecutorial discretion to limit sentencing, even if no
less arbitrary than the present unfettered judicial discretion, at least
has the potential for preventing the imposition of excessive sentences by judges who may be prone to bias because a contempt
represents an affront to their authority.242

2. Alternative Solutions to the Grand Jury Issue
Despite the lack of necessity for refusing to apply the fifth
amendment's indictment provision to criminal contempts, the preceding analysis has recognized that the extent to which a grand jury
can be expected to act as a shield against unwarranted prosecutions
is questionable. Rather, the primary benefits (in addition to enhancing the appearance of fairness in contempt proceedings) of
extending the grand jury right to contemnors lie in the collateral
consequences of such a requirement-namely, the prosecutor's power
to limit contempt sentences in all proceedings that he initiates and
the restraints on judicial initiation of contempts punishable by
more than a year's imprisonment. The judiciary, however, may be
reluctant to overrule the precedent for evaluating contempt procedures by standards of due process248 or to surrender any sentencing discretion to the executive. Moreover, even if the judiciary is
·willing to allow or promote the initiation of criminal contempts by
indictment or information on a cas~-by-case basis, it may be unwilling to yield or limit its power to impose substantial penalties
(1960) (prosecutor may not choose between negligent homicide and manslaughter
statute where latter requires more favorable standard of proof). See Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 U. COLO. L. R.EV. 455, 458-61
(1971). The Supreme Court, however, has avoided this equal protection issue, see
Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 135 (1956), and at least one other court has
found no constitutional barrier to the prosecutor's decision to charge under one of
two statutes proscribing the same conduct, even when only one of the statutes-the
one selected-required that upon conviction the defendant be given a mandatory
minimum sentence. Hutcherson v. United States, 845 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 894 (1965).
Regardless of the validity of the equal protection claim in other contexts, it should
have no applicability to the prosecutor's discretionary power to initiate a section 401
contempt proceeding by information or indictment. Since the penalty, and not the
method of initiation, determines whether the crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, see
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (misdemeanors may be initiated by indictment), a prosecutor's
decision to initiate contempt proceedings by indictment will not affect the classification
of the crime. Cf. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 135 (1956). And since the use of
an indictment will not require the imposition of any minimum sentence, there is no
danger of the prosecutor's arbitrary conduct working to the detriment of the defendant. Cf. Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965).
242 See text at notes 97-100 supra.
243. See text at notes 189-92 supra.
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in all cases. With the hope of ensuring that possible judicial reluctance to extend the fifth amendment indictment right to criminal
contempt will not impede efforts to transfer initiating discretion
from the judiciary to the executive, this subsection ·will suggest and
discuss several alternative methods of resolving the grand jury issue.
First, it would of course be possible simply to reaffirm the view
that contemnors are never entitled to a grand jury indictment. This
approach-which would not place any limitations on judicial initiating and sentencing power-offers the least protection against
potential abuses of the contempt power and is difficult to justify in
terms of the necessity rationale. It would not, however, prevent the
judiciary from encouraging or requiring the executive to initiate
· criminal contempts.244
Second, if one is concerned only with prosecutorial discretion
to limit a court's sentencing power, it would be possible for the
Supreme Court, by amendment of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or perhaps pursuant to its supervisory power,2411 to require
that all criminal contempts be initiated by indictment. Since the
criminal contempt power is easily subject to abuse and has in the
past been used as a device to inhibit dissident political activity,248
such a requirement may be desirable. Even if the grand jury would
not be an effective shield, the indictment requirement would enhance the appearance of fairness, and the burden of having to seek
an indictment could restrain overzealous prosecutors. The extent
of such restraint would be questionable, however; the indictment
requirement probably would do little to curb the excesses of personally interested or vindictive prosecutors. In addition, it would
seem anomalous for the indictment right to exist for all contempts
when the more fundamental right to a jury trial exists only in cases
in which the actual sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment.
Rather than requiring that all criminal contempts be initiated
by indictment, the Court, by amendment to the Federal Rules or
pursuant to its supervisory power, could require only that criminal
contempts initiated by the executive be by indictment.247 Limiting
the method of executive initiation would eliminate the possibility
of executive control over sentencing, and the court could justify the
244. See text at notes 193-204 supra.
245. See text at notes 194-99 supra.
246. See text at notes 145-46 supra.
247. Since there is existing precedent for the proposition that rule 42 does not
provide the exclusive method for initiating criminal contempts, see cases cited note
28 supra, reliance on the supervisory power to control the method of initiation when
rule 42 is not utilized would not have the effect of amending or limiting the scope of
rule 42. CJ. text at notes 194-99 supra.
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requirement on this basis, thereby avoiding the apparent inconsistency between the scope of the jury trial right and the indictment
right. In addition, judges could still initiate contempts if the
executive fails to act. The major disadvantage of this alternative is
that it may discourage executive initiation of contempts: So long
as the rule 42 option remains available, a prosecutor who prefers
the convenience of rule 42 could simply refuse to indict,248 thereby
forcing the court to initiate proceedings itself or let the contemnor
remain unpunished.
Another possible method of resolving the grand jury problem is
through two types of legislative action. First, as suggested above,249
Congress could repeal or limit the scope of section 40 I and treat
various types of contumacious conduct as ordinary criminal offenses
that could be initiated only by indictment or information. If these
ordinary criminal offenses contained maximum penalty provisions,
the indictment question would be resolved: A potential penalty of
more than a year's imprisonment would entitle the defendant to a
grand jury indictment.
Second, instead of or in addition to limiting the courts' initiating
discretion by narrowing the scope of section 401, Congress could impose a maximum penalty for violations of that section. Since the
Supreme Court has concluded that criminal contempts are not inherently nonpetty, a maximum penalty of no more than a year's
imprisonment would not appear unreasonable,209 and if the penalty
were so limited, there would be no basis for granting contemnors the
right to a grand jury indictment. The question of executive initiation then could be resolved by the types of executive or judicial
actions suggested previously.
A decision by Congress to establish a greater maximum penalty
for violations of section 40 I would not establish the right to an
indictment in the absence of a decision to make the fifth amendment's indictment guarantee applicable to criminal contempts. Contemnors, however, could be granted that right, either through an
amendment to the Federal Rules or through the Supreme Court's
exercise of its supervisory power.251 While such action would de248. But cf. note 98 & text at note 215 supra.
249. See text at notes 205-13 supra.
250. Cf. PROP. FED. CRIM. ConE, supra note 83, § 1341(2) (six-month maximum
prison term for criminal contempts).
251. Even though reliance on the supervisory power would in effect amend rule
42, the congressional action explicitly authorizing a serious penalty would appear to
represent a legislative judgment that contempts should no longer be viewed as inherently nonscrious offenses, and this expression of congressional intent arguably
would be a sufficient basis to justify use of the Court's supervisory power to require
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prive the judiciary of its formal initiating power, it probably would
not create the anomaly of making the indictment right more pervasive than the jury trial right-a situation that, as noted previously, would exist if a nonconstitutional right to an indictment
were extended to criminal contemnors in the absence of any maximum penalty limitations for violations of section 40 I. The legislative determination that the penalty may exceed a year's imprisonment would represent a judgment that the crime of contempt is not
a petty offense,252 and the right to trial by jury therefore presumably
would always apply.25a
The major difficulty with relying on legislative action to resolve
or assist in resolving the grand jury issue is uncertainty over the
extent to which Congress can regulate the contempt power. The
problems with regard to limiting the substantive scope of section
401 have already been mentioned.254 With regard to the imposition
of maximum penalties, the judiciary may view the failure to provide
for the possibility of serious contempt sanctions as unduly restrictive, and if, as a result of the penalty provisions, all coiltemnors
become entitled to jury trials, the judiciary may view ·the legislation
as overly burdensome.255
Potential objections to congressional regulation of contempt
sentences would perhaps be minimized by enactment of a carefully
considered statutory scheme that establishes various maximum
penalties for different types of contumacious conduct. However,
regardless of the form the legislation might take, hopefully the judiciary would continue to defer to congressional regulation and not
assert the doctrine of inherent power to invalidate contempt legislation unless it is patently unreasonable.256

III.

CONCLUSION

The analysis here has attempted to demonstrate (I) that despite
the judicial rhetoric about inherent power and the sui generis
that contemnors be given the right to a grand jury indictment. Compare Chelf v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), with text at notes 193-99 supra.
252. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970) ("Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which
docs not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months • • • is a petty offense")
with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 ("[W]hen the legislature has not expressed
a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which
may be imposed, we are to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence
of the seriousness of the offense"). See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
253. See cases cited note 47 supra.
254. See text at notes 82-85, 207-10 supra.
255. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &:
Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42 (1924), discussed at note 86 supra.
256. See note 72 supra.
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nature of criminal contempt, the only substantial difference benveen criminal contempts and other crimes is the method by which
the proceedings are initiated; (2) that, at least in recalcitrant witness
cases, the rationale of necessity, which is the basis for the exercise
of contempt power, does not justify the existence of the unique rule
42(b) initiating procedures; and (3) that there would be substantial
benefits from treating rule 42(b) criminal contempts as ordinary
criminal prosecutions for all purposes. Admittedly, however, there
are problems in moving from the premise that there is no necessity
for the unique rule 42(b) initiating procedures in most, if not all,
criminal contempt cases to some definitive action requiring that
criminal contempts be treated as ordinary criminal prosecutions.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court may view complete elimination of the judiciary's initiating power as involving too great a risk
that some contemnors may go unpunished. Even if this risk factor
is discounted, there are other obstacles to the assimilation of criminal contempts with other crimes. Uncertainty over the extent to
which the judiciary will permit legislative regulation of the contempt power may make Congress reluctant to limit the scope of
section 401 or even to provide maximum penalties for violations
of that section. The Supreme Court may be unwilling to overrule
the substantial precedent for evaluating contempt procedures by
standards of due process, and although the Court could eliminate
the rule 42(b) option through an amendment to the Federal Rules
or perhaps through the exercise of its supervisory power, it may
instead prefer to retain rule 42(b) merely to avoid facing the question whether granting contemnors the right to a grand jury indictment is appropriate.
In light of these practical restraints on congressional or Supreme
Court action to eliminate or restrict the rule 42(b) contempt power,
probably the most important recommendation made here is that
prosecutors begin to use and lower court judges to encourage the use
of the indictment process in criminal contempt cases. There is
precedent for such a practice. Moreover, reserving rule 42(b) for the
rare case in which a prosecutor fails to proceed would provide empirical evidence of the extent to which the judiciary may need to
retain initiating discretion in criminal contempt cases. This evidence
would provide a sound basis for both Congress and the Supreme
Court to reassess and clarify the nature and scope of inherent judicial contempt power.

